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 The current longitudinal study explores associations between language and social 
competence. Specifically, I examine whether language variables, such as using and hearing 
mental state words and specific aspects of communication, are linked to social competence 
through the social skill of perspective-taking and the ability to understand that other people 
might hold a false belief. A cohort of 67 children were assessed at three time points. The ini-
tial assessment took place at ages of 24–30 months; and the first follow-up assessment oc-
curred at ages of 41–49 months, and the outcome assessment took place when the children 
were aged 52–60 months. Data were collected through standardised tests of language and 
cognition, coded spontaneous play-based language samples, a nonverbal false-belief task and 
parental questionnaires that represent aspects of Cavell's (1990) social competence model. 
 The findings indicated that mothers' connected communication played a role in their 
children's social development. Mothers who more often referred to their 2-year-old child's 
utterances, reformulated, elaborated or answered to them in an appropriate manner described 
their children as socially more advanced later in development compared to mothers who were 
less connected in communication with their child. However, mothers' connectedness in com-
munication with their children was no longer a significant predictor once the children's ex-
pressive and receptive language abilities were added to the regression model. Children's ex-
pressive vocabulary including words to refer to mental states at the age of two years was a 
predictor of their social competence at five years. Children who produced more words in gen-
eral and more often used words to refer to their own and others’ mental states such as emo-
tions, desires or cognition at two years had fewer social difficulties at five years than children 
who produced fewer words and made fewer references to mental states.  
 No relationship was found among mental-state talk, communication connectedness 
and false-belief understanding and between false-belief understanding and social competence. 
ii 
 
 These findings indicate that being able to express oneself and to refer to mental states 
helps young children to interact more effectively in the social world. Therefore, considering 
the impact that early language competency has on social development identification of chil-
dren with language difficulties becomes even more important.  
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1.1 Aim of the current study 
 
 There has been a long-standing interest in the relationship between early language 
measures and later social competence, but lately, this topic has been discussed with renewed 
interest (Clegg, Law, Rush, Peters, & Roulstone, 2014; Conti-Ramsden, Mok, Pickles, & 
Durkin, 2013; Lindsay, Dockrell, & Strand, 2007). A robust association between language 
and social competence has been reported (Conti-Ramsden & Botting, 2008; Van Daal, 
Verhoeven, & Van Balkom, 2007). One major source of past research regarding this relation-
ship has been clinical groups such as children with language delay or impairment (Fujiki, 
Brinton, & Clarke, 2002; Horwitz et al., 2003; Irwin, Carter, & Briggs-Gowan, 2002; Knox & 
Conti-Ramsden, 2003). Some of these children have been described as having poor social 
skills, social cognitive abilities as well as emotional and behavioural self-regulation (Cohen et 
al., 1998; Fujiki et al., 2002; Fujiki, Brinton, & Todd, 1996; Lindsay & Dockrell, 2000; 
Lindsay et al., 2007; Marton, Abramoff, & Rosenzweig, 2005; Qi & Kaiser, 2004). These 
difficulties are in turn the bases for poorer social adjustment, especially in terms of a low 
status among peers. However, when children with language difficulties were further exam-
ined, individual differences in being socially competent became apparent. Some children with 
language difficulties also displayed social problems, but others were doing just fine in a broad 
range of social contexts. They had friends and displayed good social skills (Fujiki, Brinton, 
Morgan, & Hart, 1999; Guralnick, Connor, Hammond, Gottman, & Kinnish, 1996; McCabe 
& Meller, 2004). This indicates that the relationship between language and social competence 
is not straightforward and that it is very likely that specific variables of language and addi-




with language difficulties. To date, little is known about which aspects of language or devel-
opment are important for children to become socially competent.  
 In the current study, I examine whether specific aspects of language are linked to so-
cial competence through the social skill of perspective-taking and the ability to understand 
that a person might be mistaken about the reality and thus holding a false belief. It has been 
reported that language measures are associated with false-belief understanding in both typi-
cally developing children (Astington & Jenkins, 1999; Hughes & Dunn, 1998; Slade & 
Ruffman, 2005) and clinical groups (Happé, 1995; Nilsson & Jensen de Lopéz, 2016; 
Peterson & Siegal, 1995; Siegal & Peterson, 2008; Tager-Flusberg & Joseph, 2005). By con-
trast, considering another person's perspective and understanding that someone else might 
hold a false belief is an essential skill in developing social competence (De Rosnay, Fink, 
Begeer, Slaughter, & Peterson, 2013; Nangle, Grover, Holleb, Cassano, & Fales, 2010; 
Slaughter, Dennis, & Pritchard, 2002). Even though this indicates a probable relationship 
among these variables, the degree of association has not been established, thus warranting 
further investigation into associations among these aspects of development.  
 Three corresponding research questions aimed at addressing this aim have been formu-
lated and are presented in the current study. The first question relates to the relationships 
among mental state talk, communication connectedness and false-belief understanding in 
young children. The second research question concerns the relationships between measures of 
child and maternal mental-state talk, communication connectedness and social competence. 
The third question addresses the relationship between false-belief understanding and social 
competence. The goal is to clarify the relationship among children's developing language 






1.2 Overview of the current study 
 
 This thesis consists, in addition to this chapter (Chapter 1), of four additional chapters. 
In Chapter 2, the current study is related to the existing literature. In this chapter, background 
information for a full understanding is provided. The literature related to social competence, 
false-belief understanding, mental state talk and communication is examined. The main con-
structs of social competence and false-belief understanding are defined, and associations be-
tween the constructs are investigated. The main argument put forward in this chapter is that 
the relationship between false-belief understanding and social competence might be mediated 
by individual differences in language ability. In other words, specific language assessments 
may reflect the extent to which children's false-belief understanding hinges on their language 
abilities and how this influences their social competence. Specific research questions and hy-
potheses are formulated accordingly. Chapter 3 establishes the methodological issues and 
describes the research design of the current study. Instruments and assessments used to collect 
and analyse data are presented. A detailed coding scheme of transcripts of spontaneous play-
based language samples is provided. In chapter 4 the results of data analysis are presented. 
This chapter includes descriptive statistics for all mother and child variables, correlation and 
regression analysis that provides specific results to answer the stated research questions and 
secondary analysis. Chapter 5 provides conclusions of the current study and discusses them in 
the context of the existing literature. This chapter is the discussion on the key findings and the 
contribution of the current study. It further contains the study’s conclusions, an evaluation of 






2 Literature review and the rationale of the study 
 
 This chapter introduces and defines social competence and false-belief understanding, 
which are the main constructs in the current study. It consists of four main sections. In Section 
2.1, a possible understanding of social competence and according tripartite model are intro-
duced and discussed. This model provides important links for the assessment of children's 
social competence. In Section 2.2, false-belief understanding in children is described as a 
critical social skill in becoming socially competent; therefore, it is explored further. A possi-
ble view of the developmental trajectory of false-belief understanding is stated in this section. 
In Section 2.3, studies are reviewed that observed social competence in children who display 
either expressive language delay or a specific language impairment. This section builds the 
case that language and social competence are related, and this relationship is provided in Ap-
pendix A. In Section 2.4, this relationship is examined in more depth, and it is argued that 
language is linked to social competence through the social skill of perspective-taking and the 
ability to understand that other people might hold a false belief. How language is related spe-
cifically to this social skill is discussed in the subsequent subsections. Subsequently, specific 
research questions and hypotheses are presented. Finally, a summary and a conclusion of this 
chapter are provided.  
 
2.1 Children’s social competence 
 
 Over the last 40 years, there has been a considerable increase in research on how chil-
dren develop socially (see a review by Parker, Rubin, Price, & DeRossier, 1995). Several fac-
tors had led to this widespread interest, including an increasing recognition of associations 




(Newcomb, Bukowski, & Pattee, 1993; Parker et al., 1995). The term ‘social competence’ is 
often used as if researchers shared a common understanding. However, there are various pub-
lished definitions of social competence that have little agreement on its attributes (Dodge, 
1985; Hubbard & Coie, 1994; Nangle, Grover, Holleb, Cassano, & Fales, 2010). Table 1 pre-
sents a sample of research definitions of social competence to demonstrate the variety of defi-
nitions, as reviewed by Rose-Krasnor (1997).  
Table 1 
Definitions of ‘social competence’ 
Author Definition of ‘social competence’ 
Attili (1990) ‘social success’ (p. 241) 
Canino, Costello, & Angold (1999) 
 
‘ability to function appropriately in interper-
sonal interaction’ (cited in John, 2001, p. 182) 
Conger & Conger (1982) 
 
‘degree to which a person is successful in in-
terpersonal interactions or transactions taking 
place in the social sphere’ (p. 314) 
Duck (1989) 
 
‘ability to achieve desired outcomes and show 
adaptability across contexts’ (p. 92) 
Goldfried & D’Zurilla (1969) 
 
‘the effectiveness or adequacy with which an 
individual is capable of responding to various 




‘evaluative term based on judgments that a 
person has performed adequately’ (p. 145) 
Greenspan (1981) 
 
‘that portion of an individual’s perceived ef-
fectiveness in interpersonal situations and so-
cial roles that is attributable to qualities of 




‘quality or adequacy of a person’s overall per-
formance in a particular task’ (p.12) 
Rubin & Rose-Krasnor (1992) 
 
‘the ability to achieve personal goals in a so-
cial interaction while maintaining positive 
relationships with others over time and across 
situations’ (p. 285) 
Taylor & Asher (1984) 
 
‘the formulation and adaption of personal 
goals that are appropriate and adaptive to spe-
cific social situations and implementing effec-







‘the possession of the capability to generate 
skilled behaviour’ (p. 57) 
Waters & Sroufe (1983) 
 
‘an ability to generate and coordinate flexible, 
adaptive responses to demands and to generate 
and capitalise on opportunities in the envi-
ronment (i.e., effectiveness)’ (p. 80) 
White (1959) 
 
‘an organism’s capacity to interact effectively 
with its environment’ (p. 297) 
Yeates & Selman (1989) 
 
‘the development of the social-cognitive skills 
and knowledge, including the capacity for 
emotional control, to mediate behavioural 
performance in specific contexts, which in 
turn are judged by the self and others to be 
successful and thereby increase the likelihood 
of positive psychosocial adjustment’ (p. 66) 
Note: Reprinted with permission from “The Nature of Social Competence: A Theoretical Review,” by 
L. Rose-Krasnor, 1997, pp. 111–135. 
 
 Although these definitions differ in focus and detail, common elements are apparent. 
Most of these researchers appear to agree that social competence entails being effective within 
a social context which means activating the most appropriate social skill to handle a given 
social situation and to manipulate others to achieve a desired goal. Appropriate and effective 
social interactions are needed for successful performance across diverse settings (e.g., home, 
work, school, and social events) and with a variety of people, including family, friends, su-
pervisors and other members of the community (Hansen, Giacoletti, & Nangle, 1995). Indi-
viduals who are regarded as being socially competent and interpersonally skilful display the 
ability to relate to other people effectively in various social settings (Kelly, 1982).  
 However, despite this general agreement, discordance arises at more specific levels of 
definition. Several models of social competence have included a wide range of possible skills 
associated with competence. Cavell (1990) proposed a tripartite model (illustrated in Figure 1) 
that summarises the most important types of operational definitions that have emerged in the 
social development literature. This model portrays social competence as a multilevel, hierar-










Figure 1. Cavell's (1990) tripartite model of social competence. 
 
 Social adjustment is at the top of the hierarchy and reflects the extent to which indi-
viduals achieve societally determined, developmentally appropriate goals (Ford, 1982; Zigler 
& Trickett, 1978). These goals are age-appropriate accomplishments that are often viewed as 
valuable, such as legal status, academic or occupational status, and socioeconomic status. An-
other measurement of social adjustment is psychological status, which involves social (e.g., 
peer status), emotional (e.g., self-concept and others’ global judgment), familial (e.g., make-
up and degree of cohesion), and relation (e.g., quality of friendships and dating frequency) 
status.  
 Social performance refers to the overall quality of an individual’s responses in relevant 
social situations. Specifically, it refers to a degree in which an individual’s response meets 
socially valid criteria. Social performance is distinct from its hypothesised skills and supposed 
products. Methods of identifying relevant social tasks and associated task criteria should be 
socially valid and empirical.  
 The final component, social skills, is defined as the specific abilities or behaviours that 
individuals display to produce a certain social response. Proposed skills which seem to be 
necessary for being socially competent range from cognitive (e.g., false-belief understanding, 
perspective-taking, skills for processing/acquisition), emotional (e.g., affect regulation), and 
Social Adjustment 





behavioural (e.g., communication skills and pro-social behaviour) skills and abilities as well 
as motivational and expectancy sets (e.g., moral development and self-efficacy).  
 This hierarchical model indicates that the components build on each other. For exam-
ple, it suggests that having good initial social skills may lead to good social performance and 
later successful adjustment. For instance, a child with appropriate social skills may often be 
chosen to play with and is liked to be part of group activities. Moreover, continued acceptance 
by peers and inclusion into peer groups may initiate, motivate and support the development of 
further social skills, enhance interpersonal understanding and foster feelings of social self-
worth (Hartup, 1983; Parker et al., 1995). Furthermore, continued acceptance by peers and 
inclusion into peer groups may increase the child’s social, emotional and relationship status.  
 Conversely, social skill deficits may lead to more long-term performance and adjust-
ment problems. For example, a child with language difficulties may be less proficient in 
communicating his or her intentions, feelings, and problem-solving strategies and, therefore, 
be perceived as less socially competent and face repeated rejection and exclusion from peer-
group activities. As a result, such a child may spend more time alone or interacting with less 
skilled peers, thus limiting his or her opportunities to learn age-appropriate social skills for 
future interactions. Links between poor peer relationships in childhood and long-term social 
adjustment difficulties have been reported. For example, preschool children who are rejected 
by their peers can be expected to experience continued social problems, poor school adjust-
ment, greater academic difficulties, and mental health problems at a later stage (Ladd & 
Asher, 1985; Parker & Asher, 1987). Boivin, Hymel and Bukowski (1995) reported that peer 
rejection and social isolation lead to feelings of uncertainty, loneliness and anger, thus creat-
ing vulnerability to anxiety, depression and estrangement. It was also argued that rejected 
children tend to choose disruptive and/or destructive solutions to problems (Fabes, Gaertner, 





 Even though many examples of links among social skills, social performance and so-
cial adjustment have been demonstrated, there remains a disagreement about whether social 
skills that are needed to meet task demands are sufficient for a successful social performance. 
Sometimes children choose social goals that lead to poor performance even though they pos-
sess the necessary skills or they perform inappropriately because of a lack of motivation for 
doing well (Gresham & Cavell, 1986; Renshaw & Asher, 1983). Depending on the environ-
ment, the use of antisocial skills, rather than pro-social skills, can sometimes be the most ef-
fective strategy to reach a goal. Cavell (1990) argued that from a pragmatic viewpoint, social 
skills are necessary but insufficient elements of effective social behaviour, and consequently, 
deficits should not be considered as the only cause of poor performance. It is unclear whether 
inadequate performance can be explained only by a skill deficit or whether other factors also 
play a role. 
 Therefore, to successfully evaluate children's social competence, Cavell (1990) high-
lighted the importance of a broad assessment that considers the tripartite model. Specifically, 
this means that a broad-based assessment of social adjustment, social performance in relevant 





2.2 Children’s perspective taking and false-belief understanding  
 
 Nangle et al. (2010) indicated that there is considerable consensus in the literature that 
one social skill that is considered to be necessary for being socially competent is making in-
ferences about the behaviours, thoughts, beliefs and emotions of others and considering their 
perspective. Attributing false beliefs about oneself and others is one of the most important 
milestones in this skill; that is, to understand that a person might be mistaken about the reality 
and thus be holding a false belief. Many terms have been suggested for this ability, including 
‘theory of mind’ (Wellman, 1990), ‘mind-reading’ (Apperly, 2011), ‘mental state understand-
ing’ (Flavell, 2000), ‘emotion understanding’ (Harris, 1989) and ‘social understanding’ 
(Carpendale & Lewis, 2006). These are overlapping terms that are used interchangeably at 
times (Astington & Baird, 2005). Even though the term 'theory of mind' currently dominates 
the field, it will not be further used in the current study. Over the recent years, the assessment 
of the theory of mind has been greatly expanded by using new tasks, testing a greater age 
range of human participants and adopting methods from cognitive psychology and neurosci-
ence. Apperly (2012), therefore, stated that there is more to theory of mind than is commonly 
supposed. He argued that different traditions and approaches in research on the theory of mind 
are committed to different views of what theory of mind is: supposing that it is a body of con-
ceptual knowledge that is consisted in cognitive processes and that it is a social competence 
that can vary across individuals. Apperly (2012) argued that is it critical to distinguish be-
tween these aspects because they lead us to asking different questions that need to be ad-
dressed in different ways. Given the context, one purpose of the current study is to investigate 
children's ability to consider someone else's perspective and their capacity to understand false 
belief. In particular, the focus of the current study is on the important role that children’s lan-
guage abilities and conversational environments play in promoting their ability to draw such 




one aspect of the theory of mind; therefore, I opted against using this term. As Bloom and 
German (2000) further highlighted, there is more to the theory of mind than passing a false-
belief task.  
The understanding that other people can have a false belief has been found to be criti-
cal for children to become socially competent (De Rosnay et al., 2013; Slaughter et al., 2002). 
De Rosnay et al. (2013) found that false-belief understanding predicted socially competent 
everyday behaviour such as successful conversational interactions with peers in young school-
attending children. Slaughter et al. (2002) found a significant relationship between false-belief 
understanding and peer acceptance in preschool children. Other studies have related false-
belief understanding to more positive peer interactions (Dunn & Cutting, 1999; Dunn, 
Cutting, & Demetriou, 2000; Mcelwain, Hill, & Volling, 2002). Additionally, significant as-
sociations were found between false-belief understanding and understanding deception 
(Sodian, 1991), jokes and lies (Leekam & Prior, 1994), irony, white lies and double bluff 
(Happé, 1994). Furthermore, associations between false-belief understanding and the overall 
pragmatic language competence have been reported (Eisenmajer & Prior, 1991).  
 From their second year of life on, children develop an understanding of the intentional 
nature of human behaviour (Harris, 1989; Nelson, 2005). This involves an understanding of 
their own and others' mental states, the ability to draw inferences about others' mental states, 
intentions and perspectives as well as an understanding of deception and false belief (Hwa-
Froelich, 2015). One of the first empirical investigations into the understanding of false belief 
was conducted by Clements and Perner (1994), who observed children's eye gaze during an-
ticipation of an actor's return to search for a displaced object. They found that children be-
tween the ages of 2;11 and 3;7 years gave an incorrect verbal response when asked where the 
actor would re-appear to search for the object but looked at the correct location. The majority 
of older children both gave a correct verbal response and looked at the correct location. 




standing of belief, which could be fundamental for their explicit understanding that emerges 
sometime during their fifth year of life. Implicit understanding of belief is unconscious, 
whereas explicit understanding is conscious and abstract. Since then, several studies have 
documented that implicit false-belief performance is present in children between the ages of 
14 and 24 months using a violation-of-expectations paradigm or similar measures of looking 
time to test infants' understanding of belief (Onishi & Baillargeon, 2005; Southgate, 
Chevallier, & Csibra, 2010; Surian, Caldi, & Sperber, 2007). Onishi and Baillargeon (2005) 
reported that infants as young as 15 months look longer (indicating increased processing time) 
when an actor looks for a displaced object in its new location rather than where they last saw 
it. Related results have since been independently obtained with 13-month-olds (Surian et al., 
2007). Further support for the implicit understanding of false belief can be found in children’s 
early social interactions. Children as young as two years begin to indicate new and advanced 
forms of social interaction, including tricks, jokes and deception (Newton, Reddy, & Bull, 
2000) and blaming others for their own wrongdoings (Dunn, 1988; Wilson, Smith, & Ross, 
2003). Rather than being simple behavioural practices that achieve desired outcomes and 
avoid undesired consequences, such behaviours appear to mirror young children’s thoughtful 
attempts to create false beliefs about others (Newton et al., 2000). 
 Explicit understanding of belief has been reported to be observable in children from 
the age of four years onwards (Baron-Cohen, Leslie, & Frith, 1986; Gopnik & Astington, 
1988; Perner, Leekam, & Wimmer, 1987; Wellman, Cross, & Watson, 2001; Wellman & 
Bartsch, 1988; Wimmer & Perner, 1983). This later developing system is abstract and con-
scious (Low, 2010) and allows children to explain verbally why someone has a false belief 
and how that false belief affects his or her actions. It is from four years onwards that most 
children are able to pass different variations of the false-belief task pioneered by Wimmer and 
Perner (1983). In an unexpected change-of-location false-belief task, children observe a pro-




how this object is placed in another location while the protagonist is either distracted or not 
present. Finally, the experimenter wants to establish whether a child understands that the pro-
tagonist mistakenly believes that the object is still in the original location. There is a broad 
variation of how to test this understanding, for example, by asking the child where the pro-
tagonist will look for the object (Baron-Cohen, Leslie, & Frith, 1985; Wimmer & Perner, 
1983) or by engaging the child to help the protagonist (Buttelmann, Carpenter, & Tomasello, 
2009; Southgate et al., 2010). These improvements in understanding belief seem to make 
four-year-olds more sophisticated social partners; false-belief performance is related to 
teacher ratings of social and conversational skills (De Rosnay et al., 2013; Lalonde & 
Chandler, 1995). A child’s mastery of false-belief understanding could conceivably ‘trans-
form children’s social relations’ (Hughes & Leekam, 2004, p. 590) because they start to real-
ise that people’s behaviours are sometimes not what reality might dictate. 
 Most obvious becomes the relationship between false-belief understanding and social 
competence in children with autistic spectrum disorders. These children are described as hav-
ing difficulties in understanding false belief and also having impairments in social and com-
municative functioning (Leslie, 1987). 
 
2.3 Social competence in late talkers and children with specific language impairment  
 
 The previous two sections have introduced the main constructs of social competence 
and false-belief understanding. Possible definitions and developmental trajectories have been 
provided to establish the general framework to be used. In this section, language and its typi-
cal and atypical development is discussed. Associations between early language skills and 
social competence is demonstrated by summarising studies that include children with lan-




 Language is a complex multifaceted system that is used for social communication 
(Astington & Baird, 2005). Through language, people are able to express themselves and un-
derstand others. In a successful verbal interaction, people use socially determined shared rules 
(e.g., word meaning, pronunciation, word combinations, grammar rules, gestures, and facial 
expression). A distinction can be made between receptive and expressive language. Receptive 
language is the ability to understand input from both spoken and written language. It is more 
than just understanding words and gestures but also includes the ability to understand gram-
matical forms such as interpreting a question. Expressive language is considered as the output 
of language and includes spoken language. It is important to make a distinction between 
speech and expressive language. Speech production refers to the manner a person produces 
speech sounds, whereas expressive language is the ability to put thoughts, wants and beliefs 
into words and sentences. Children vary in their development of receptive- and expressive-
language skills, but similar patterns have been described. Typically, children utter their first 
words between 9 and 18 months. By this age, their vocabulary can include 50 to 150 words. 
Around their second birthday, they can produce over 300 words and understand about 1000. 
In addition, they begin to put words together to form two-word sentences such as "mummy 
car". A year later, they use language to get things, to ask questions, to talk about past experi-
ences, and even to pretend. Around four-and-a-half years of age, children begin to understand 
and use more sophisticated rules of language and begin to sound more adult-like. In school, 
children maintain the expansion of their use of language; they refine their grammatical skills 
and learn to read and write (Gleason & Ratner, 2013; Huilt & Howard, 2001).  
 Some children do not reach these well-established milestones and are delayed or im-
paired in their language development. Children who are delayed in their expressive language 
are called "late talkers". They are usually recognised in the age range of 18–30 months. There 
are a number of criteria used to identify these children. They use expressive words that are 




& Gavin, 1998), a performance that is more than one standard deviation below the mean on a 
standardised language assessment (Zubrick, Taylor, Rice, & Slegers, 2007) or cut-offs of the 
10th, 15th and 20th percentiles for expressive vocabulary (Beckage, Smith, & Hills, 2011). 
Leonard (1998) defined children who score less than 1–1.5 standard deviations below the 
mean on one or more sub-tests of a standardised language measure, in the absence of sensory, 
environmental, cognitive or social emotional difficulties, as children with specific language 
impairment (SLI). Prevalence of SLI is reported between 3 and 7% (Norbury & Paul, 2013).  
 Although language skills are presumed to be one crucial aspect of a successful social 
interaction (Hazen & Black, 1989), the nature of the relationship between language and social 
competence is still unclear (Botting & Conti-Ramsden, 2008; Fujiki, Brinton, & Clarke, 
2002). Most research regarding language skills and social competence has been conducted on 
clinical groups such as the aforementioned late talkers and children with SLI. 
 The interest in the social and behavioural development of children with speech and 
language difficulties stems mostly from the work of Baker and Cantwell (1987), who studied 
psychiatric outcomes for children with language difficulties in later childhood. Children with 
speech and language difficulties displayed more psychiatric problems compared to controls. 
This early study reported that children with receptive rather than expressive language difficul-
ties were more at risk to display a psychiatric problem. However, the findings were con-
founded by the heterogeneity of the children involved, thus making it difficult to describe the 
nature of the relationship between language difficulties and social and behavioural develop-
ment. Many subsequent studies have explored this relationship in more depth.  
 Four research groups have observed social competence in children with expressive 
language delay at the age of approximately two years (Carson, Klee, Lee, Williams, & Perry, 
1997, 1998; Horwitz et al., 2003; Irwin, Carter, & Briggs-Gowan, 2002; Paul, Looney, & 
Dahm, 1991). All these studies found a close relationship between expressive language delay 




lower scores on standardised socialisation scales compared to their age-matched, typically 
developing peers. Children at the age of 24 months with expressive language delay exhibited 
more symptoms of anxiety and depression, withdrawal, sleep problems and other behavioural 
disturbances than their typically developing peers (Carson et al., 1998). Irwin et al. (2002) 
found that children in the age range of 21–31 months with expressive language delay are more 
likely to experience depression and withdrawal and to display less social understanding and 
interest in play than typically developing controls. In addition, Horwitz et al. (2003) found 
that two-year-olds with expressive language delay are seven times more likely than typically 
developing children to also display low social performance in interacting with their peers.  
 Children with SLI as a group tend to score lower than typically developing children on 
a range of social skill measures, measures of social cognitive abilities as well as emotional 
and behavioural self-regulation (Cohen et al., 1998; Fujiki, Brinton, & Clark, 2002; Fujiki, 
Brinton, & Todd, 1996; Huaqing Qi & Kaiser, 2004; Lindsay & Dockrell, 2000; Lindsay, 
Dockrell, & Strand, 2007; McCabe & Meller, 2004; Marton, Abramoff, & Rosenzweig, 
2005). Some of these children feel more lonely and less often chosen to play with by their 
classmates (Fujiki et al., 1996; Gertner, Rice, & Hadley, 1994); about a third of them are bul-
lied by peers and can be targets of victimisation (Conti-Ramsden & Botting, 2004; Knox & 
Conti-Ramsden, 2003). Teachers report that they can have lower social skills and more behav-
iour problems than their peers (Fujiki, Brinton, & Todd, 1996). Children with SLI were also 
rated as having significantly more hyperactivity than children with typically developing lan-
guage (Beitchman, Wilson, Brownlie, Walters, & Lancee, 1996; Bretherton et al., 2013; 
Lindsay, Dockrell, & Strand, 2007; McCabe & Meller, 2004; McCabe, 2005). Furthermore, 
children with SLI often have the desire to approach other children but are afraid of doing so 
and spend significantly less time interacting with their peers in the playground than typically 
developing children (Fujiki, Brinton, Isaacson, & Summers, 2001; Fujiki, Spackman, Brinton, 




guage-impaired children has been reported (Nelson, Benner, & Cheney, 2005; Stanton-
Chapman, Justice, Skibbe, & Grant, 2007). Children with SLI are described as displaying 
more internalising problem behaviours than age-matched children. Children with internalising 
problem behaviours have difficulty coping with negative emotions or stressful situations, so 
they direct their feelings inside. Because they occur on the inside, internalising behaviours are 
typically not visible to others. Internalised problem behaviours that have been found in chil-
dren with SLI are social withdrawal, difficulty with emotional decoding, social problem solv-
ing and peer problems (Brinton & Fujiki, 1999; Cohen et al., 1998; Fujiki et al., 1996; Fujiki, 
Brinton, Isaacson, & Summers, 2001; Redmond & Rice, 1998; Stanton-Chapman et al., 
2007). Yet children with SLI are also at increased risk of externalising difficulties. These are 
problem behaviours that are directed toward the external environment. Instead of expressing 
their negative emotions, children with externalising behaviours direct those towards other 
people. Externalising problem behaviours that are found in children with SLI are conduct 
problems and hyperactivity (Beitchman et al., 2001; Botting & Conti-Ramsden, 2000; 
Bretherton et al., 2013; Brownlie et al., 2004; Cohen et al., 1993; Conti-Ramsden & Botting, 
2004; Ripley & Yuill, 2005). Children with SLI are less active in co-operative work groups 
than their typically developing peers (Brinton, Fujiki, & Higbee, 1998). In general, children 
with SLI are less likely to exhibit skilled pro-social behaviour (Bretherton et al., 2013a; Fujiki 
et al., 1999; Stevens & Bliss, 1995). 
 The risk of developing social and behavioural difficulties in children with SLI seems 
to increase across childhood (Bartak, Rutter, & Cox, 1975; Beitchman, Cohen, Konstantareas, 
& Tannock, 1996; Botting & Conti-Ramsden, 2000). Cantwell, Baker, Rutter and Mawhood 
(1989) compared boys with SLI and boys with autism with regard to their social and behav-
ioural development. Difficulties within these fields of development were severe and persisting 




not display social and behavioural problems at those ages, but the difficulties emerged in later 
childhood and worsened as they grew older (Howlin, Mawhood, & Rutter, 2000).  
 Longitudinal studies of children with SLI indicated that early language difficulties can 
later have an impact on employment opportunities, friendships, romantic relationships, and 
general well-being as well as an increased likelihood of involvement in antisocial behaviour 
(Brownlie et al., 2004; Clegg, Hollis, Mawhood, & Rutter, 2005; Records, Tomblin, & 
Freese, 1992; Snowling, Bishop, Stothard, Chipchase, & Kaplan, 2006). Young men at the 
age of 19 years with a history of SLI had higher rates of arrests and convictions even though 
they exhibited a lower level of aggression than young men without language impairment. This 
indicates an association between speech and language difficulties and the development of 
antisocial behaviour (Brownlie et al., 2004). Adults with SLI displayed a high level of social 
maladaptation and poor psychosocial functioning when compared to controls (Clegg et al., 
2005). Seventeen men with SLI in their mid-30s were assessed for social adaption. The men 
displayed a higher rate of unstable employment histories with prolonged unemployment. 
More than half of them reported a limited range of friendships and experienced fewer roman-
tic relationships compared to controls.  
 When one considers these studies on late talkers and children with SLI, the relation-
ship between language difficulties and social competence becomes obvious. Lower language 
skills seem to influence the development of social skills such as pro-social behaviour and 
conversation skills as well as social performance. In addition, these difficulties seem to pro-
mote poorer social adjustment, especially in terms of low peer and relation status. However, 
when children with language difficulties are further examined, individual differences in being 
socially competent become apparent. Some children with language difficulties also display 
social problems, but others do just fine in various social contexts. They have friends and dis-
play social skills that can be considered to be good (Fujiki et al., 1999; Guralnick et al., 1996; 




individuals with language impairment reported a normal range of social relationships, com-
pared to 92% of typical children at the same age. Although these differences are significant, a 
large number (46%) of adolescents with language impairment still reported typical social ex-
perience. This indicates that the relationship between language and social competence is not 
straightforward and that it is very likely that specific variables of language and additional as-
pects of development must further influence social competence in children with language dif-
ficulties.  
 
2.4 Language and the development of perspective taking and false-belief understanding  
 
 As described in Section 2.2, understanding false belief is essential to becoming so-
cially competent, but it has also been reported that language measures are related to taking 
someone else's perspective into account and understanding that a person might hold a false 
belief. Experimental support for this relationship has been found in children with typical lan-
guage development (Astington & Jenkins, 1999; Ted Ruffman, Slade, Rowlandson, Rumsey, 
& Garnham, 2003; Slade & Ruffman, 2005; Watson, Painter, & Bornstein, 2001). Astington 
and Jenkins (1999) assessed 59 three-year-olds on language and false-belief understanding 
three times over a period of seven months. They concluded that language abilities predicted 
false-belief understanding, but false-belief understanding did not predict later language per-
formance. Slade and Ruffman (2005) assessed 44 children at a mean age of three years and 
eight months with typical language development on four language and three false-belief tasks. 
The same children were re-tested six months later. They reported that language predicted later 
performance on false belief tasks.  
 Further support for a relationship between language and false-belief understanding has 
been found in studies including children with autism (Fisher, Happé, & Dunn, 2005; Happé, 




role of age and verbal ability in false-belief understanding. She reported that a higher verbal 
mental age was required in children with autistic spectrum disorder to pass false-belief tasks 
than in typically developing children. Fisher et al. (2005) also found a significant relationship 
between language performance and false-belief understanding when testing 44 children with 
autism. Specifically, grammar and vocabulary were significant predictors of false-belief un-
derstanding in children with autism.  
 Similar findings were reported for children with language impairment (Farrant, 
Fletcher, & Maybery, 2006; Holmes, 2002; Tucker, 2004). Farrant et al. (2006) reported a 
significantly lower score on false-belief tasks for children with SLI than for typically develop-
ing children. Nilsson and Jensen de Lopéz (2016) reviewed 17 studies including 745 children 
between 4 and 12 years old. They reported that children with SLI performed poorer on false-
belief assessments compared with their typically developing peers. 
 More evidence for a relationship between language performance and false-belief un-
derstanding came from studies that observed children with visual impairment (see Siegal & 
Peterson (2008) for a review) and young late-signing children with hearing impairment who 
were born into non-signing families and, therefore, have restricted access to family conversa-
tions (Meristo, Strid, & Hjelmquist, 2016; Peterson & Siegal, 1995; Peterson, 2009). Peterson 
and Siegal (2000) reviewed 11 published studies that assessed more than 200 children with 
hearing impairment all over the world whose false-belief understanding was assessed using 
sign language. They reported that serious difficulties in standard false-belief tasks were con-
sistently revealed by late-signing children with hearing impairment, whereas native signing 
children with hearing impairment displayed no such difficulties.   
 So far, studies that demonstrate a link between language performance and false-belief 
understanding have been summarised. Further information, which helps to improve the under-
standing of the relationship between language and false-belief understanding, is provided by 




based interventions improved children’s false-belief understanding. In one intervention, chil-
dren were talking about story characters that held false beliefs. In a second intervention, they 
discussed story characters that made false claims. In both settings, the children received cor-
rective verbal feedback if they misinterpreted what the character had said or thought. Both 
interventions proved very effective in assessing three-years-olds’ understanding of false be-
lief. 
 Considering these studies, it becomes apparent that certain aspects of language are 
related to false-belief understanding. Nonetheless, it is still unclear which specific elements of 
language are involved in children's false-belief understanding. This has been a topic of some 
dispute (Astington & Baird, 2005; Botting & Conti-Ramsden, 2008; Carpendale & Lewis, 
2006; Milligan, Astington, & Dack, 2007). Recently, two main specific but related claims 
have been made about this relationship. First, it has been argued that the acquisition of words 
to refer to mental states (mental state talk) is crucial for children's false-belief understanding 
(Jenkins, Turrell, Kogushi, Lollis, & Ross, 2003; Symons, Fossum, & Collins, 2006). Second, 
it has been argued that verbal interchange that children experience in communication plays a 
significant role in false-belief understanding (Dunn, Brown, Slomkowski, Tesla, & 
Youngblade, 1991; Harris, 1996, 2005; Tomasello, 2000). Especially, communication that 
takes place in the context of positive joint activities (connected communication) seems to be 
important. From this understanding, children with autistic spectrum disorder, late-signing 
children with hearing impairment and children with visual impairment may all have, for dif-
ferent reasons, difficulties in participating in everyday communication with others. There is a 
possibility that this might affect their acquisition of false-belief understanding. What is not yet 
clear in this account, however, is whether references to mental states or communication itself 






2.5 Mental state talk 
 
 Mental states refer to internal psychological experiences (e.g., desires, emotions, 
thoughts and knowledge) that cannot be directly perceived by third persons in the same man-
ner that physical bodies can (Moore, 2007). Mental states are defined with regard to the chal-
lenge children face when trying to link apparent actions and behaviours with mental states 
that cannot be observed directly. In other words, people do not have access to what others 
want, like or know but must infer these mental states on the basis of what they do and say. 
Additionally, mental states cannot be regarded as isolated entities. Rather, they need to be 
understood with regard to the person who is experiencing the mental state and the context in 
which the person has the mental experience. Barresi and Moore (1996), therefore, defined 
mental states in terms of intentional relations in which a mental state mediates the relation 
between a subject and an object. Consider the following examples: (a) Nino thinks that his 
ice-cream is cold; (b) Nino wants to have an ice-cream; and (c) Nino loves his ice-cream. In 
all three examples, there is a subject (Nino), who is engaged in some intentional activity 
(italicised verb) with an object (the ice-cream). How the relationship between the subject and 
the object is understood is dependent on the specific mental state term. 
 Given this understanding, Hall and Nagy (1987) offered an informative framework 
that includes three categories of mental state terms: (1) those that refer to intentions and de-
sires (e.g., want, like, wish, and need); (2) those that encode meanings about what is experi-
enced, whether in the form of emotions (e.g., happy, sad, afraid, and grumpy) or physiological 
reactions (e.g., hungry, tired, and thirsty); and (3) those that encode beliefs or cognitive states 
(e.g., think, know, remember, and believe).  
 Bartsch and Wellman (1995) found that by 18 months, children begin to produce their 
first words such as 'want' to refer to their own and others’ desires. Furthermore, at the same 




‘mad’ (Bartsch & Wellman, 1995; Dunn, Bretherton, & Munn, 1987). By 28 months, children 
more often use terms that refer to physiological states, whereas terms that refer to cognitions 
and beliefs are less common (Bretherton & Beeghly, 1982). These terms (such as think, know, 
and guess) seem to appear more often at the age of approximately three years (Bartsch & 
Wellman, 1995; Shatz, Wellman, & Silber, 1983).  
 When parents talk to 16-month-olds in everyday situations, they use desire terms (spe-
cifically ‘want’) more frequently than other mental state terms (Smiley & Huttenlocher, 
1989). References to cognitive states using the terms ‘think’ and ‘know’ increase with age 
(Beeghly, Bretherton, & Mervis, 1986; Ted Ruffman, Slade, & Crowe, 2002; Taumoepeau & 
Ruffman, 2006, 2008), although the proportion of desire terms to cognitive terms can vary 
considerably for individual children (Bartsch & Wellman, 1995). When parents refer to emo-
tions, pleasure and distress terms are used most frequently (Brown & Dunn, 1991; Dunn et al., 
1987, 1991; Smiley & Huttenlocher, 1989). Thus, before a child’s second birthday, parents 
most often refer to children’s desires and emotions but increasingly start to talk about 
thoughts and knowledge around 24 months. 
 Several studies have explored the relationship between parental and child mental state 
talk. It has been argued that mothers’ talk about desires predicts pre-schoolers’ later talk about 
cognition more than mothers’ talk about cognition (Bartsch & Wellman, 1995; Ruffman et al., 
2002). In addition, it has been reported that parental talk about cognition is related with chil-
dren’s later use of cognitive state terms (Jenkins, Turrell, Kogushi, Lollis, & Ross, 2003; 
Ruffman et al., 2002).  
 It has been reported that having discussions about mental states, such as desires, emo-
tions, thoughts and knowledge, is important for understanding others’ minds and false belief 
(Adrian et al., 2007; Astington & Baird, 2005; Judy Dunn & Brophy, 2005; Hughes & Dunn, 
1997; Jenkins et al., 2003; Racine et al., 2007; Ruffman et al., 2002; Symons et al., 2006; 




children, parents refer to a child’s desires, beliefs, and emotions (e.g., ‘You want the car, but 
we left it at home’; ‘You know what that is’; and ‘Now you feel sad.’). Importantly, parents 
use the same mental state terms to talk about other people (e.g., ‘Jack wants the car too’; ‘I 
think dad will come home soon’; and ‘The girl looks happy.’). Through these discussions, 
children learn to link apparent actions and behaviours with mental states that are inaccessible 
to direct observation (Nelson, 2005).  
 Experimental and observational studies found that children have a better understand-
ing of others' mental states and false belief if the mothers more often discussed mental states 
with them (De Rosnay, Pons, Harris, & Morrell, 2004; Dunn et al., 1991; Ensor, Devine, 
Marks, & Hughes, 2014; Meins et al., 2002, 2003; Meins, Fernyhough, Arnott, Leekam, & De 
Rosnay, 2013; Ruffman et al., 2002; Symons, Peterson, Slaughter, Roche, & Doyle, 2005; 
Symons et al., 2006; Symons, 2004; Tompkins, 2015). For example, Howard, Mayeux and 
Naigles (2008) observed mothers and their 3–4-year-old children while they interacted in a 
naturalistic setting at home. They found that mothers’ cognitive state vocabulary predicted 
children's false-belief understanding after controlling for other variables, such as children's 
general language and age. In other studies, mothers of pre-schoolers were observed during a 
book-reading interaction, and their mental state language was found to be associated with and 
predict their children's false-belief understanding after controlling for the children's verbal IQ 
and age (Adrian, Clemente, Villanueva, & Rieffe, 2005; Slaughter, Peterson, & Mackintosh, 
2007). In addition, there is longitudinal support (Adrian et al., 2007; Ruffman et al., 2002) for 
maternal mental state talk as a developmental precursor to children's false-belief performance. 
Using a task in which mothers discussed 10 photographs with pre-schoolers, Ruffman et al. 
(2002) found that mothers’ mental state talk predicted children's later false-belief understand-
ing. However, they found that children's earlier false-belief understanding did not predict 




such as descriptive or causal comments, did not predict children's later false-belief under-
standing. 
 These studies indicate that there is a unique relationship between mothers’ mental state 
talk and children's false-belief understanding. A remaining question is whether it is maternal 
talk that refers to all types of mental states or specifically language involving terms that refer 
to cognitive mental states that is related to early false-belief understanding. Peterson and 
Slaughter (2003) raised the possibility that maternal cognitive mental state talk is strongly 
associated with children’s false-belief understanding. However, other research suggests that 
maternal references to various mental states, such as desire, belief and emotion, are signifi-
cantly correlated not only with false-belief understanding (Adrian et al., 2005; Dunn et al., 
1991) but also with the understanding of emotional and other mental states (Dunn et al., 1991; 
Ruffman et al., 2002; Taumoepeau & Ruffman, 2006). This is an important issue because if it 
is the case that language that refers to cognitive mental states promotes cognitive understand-
ing, and language that refers to emotion mental states promotes emotion understanding, it 
could be assumed that the specific content of the mother–child is important. Otherwise, if talk 
that refers to all types of mental states is crucial for the development of false-belief under-
standing, it could be argued that it is rather the general exchange of viewpoints that has an 
impact on children's false-belief understanding (Harris, 1999a; Harris, De Rosnay, & Pons, 
2005; Hughes & De Rosnay, 2006). However, given the limited support for a relationship 
between a specific group of maternal mental state terms and children's false belief understand-
ing, there is a need for further investigation.  
 Another question that needs to be further addressed is whether children’s mental state 
talk is an indicator of their false-belief understanding. It has been proposed that a child's use 
of mental state words has develops the most during the third year of the child’s life 
(Bretherton & Beeghly, 1982; Shatz et al., 1983). As described previously, this is also the age 




supports the notion of a possible relationship. Little research has been done in this regard. It 
was reported that children's use of mental state words in conversations with siblings and 
friends and during book reading with their parents was related with their performance in dif-
ferent false-belief measures (Bretherton & Beeghly, 1982; Brown, Donelan-McCall, & Dunn, 
1996; Hughes & Dunn, 1998; Nielsen & Dissanayake, 2000). Nielsen and Dissanayake (2000) 
found a correlation between 3–4-year-olds' use of mental state words during symbolic play 
with parents and their false-belief understanding. Additionally, these variables were also 
found to be related when children interacted with their friends (Hughes & Dunn, 1998).  
 A restriction of most studies on mental state talk and children’s false-belief under-
standing has been a focus on solely these two aspects. It is of great interest to find out whether 
and how these aspects relate to a child's social competence. Observing whether early mental 
state talk and later false-belief understanding have an impact on children’s social competence 
might provide further insight into the impact of language on social development.  
 In summary, there seems to be a unique relationship between maternal mental state 
talk and children's false-belief understanding, whereas little is known about the influence of 
children's mental state talk on their own false-belief understanding. In the next section, the 
focus will lay on communication and how this variable might relate to false-belief understand-
ing.  
 
2.6 Communication connectedness   
 
 Communication is described as an important social skill for one to be able to consider 
someone else's perspective and understand that the other person might hold a false belief 
(Dunn, Brown, Slomkowski, Tesla, & Youngblade, 1991; Harris, 1996, 2005; Tomasello, 




that he or she does not know primarily through communication (De Rosnay & Hughes, 2006; 
Harris, 1999a). Along the same lines, Tomasello (2000) argued that communication is related 
to false-belief understanding and perspective-taking because people are regularly reminded 
that others have different beliefs, desires and intentions. He stressed the importance of com-
munication that involves misunderstandings and requests for clarification because this shows 
that people have different perspectives or understandings of situations. Such forms of com-
munication are common in parent–child interactions in which parents elaborate on children’s 
statements by representing them with their own perspective (e.g., ‘I think that’s funny’; ‘Did 
that frighten you?’; ‘He was just being silly.’; ‘No, I would rather take the other one.’). En-
gaging in these types of interactions forces children to take perspective of others and compare 
and contrast them with their own. Through this, children start to realise that adults are more 
than animate agents and become aware of them as intentional and mental agents (Nelson, 
1996; Tomasello, 2000). 
 There is empirical support for this perspective. Training studies have indicated that 
children perform better in false-belief tasks if they were earlier engaged in communication 
about mental states (Appleton & Reddy, 1996; Guajardo & Watson, 2002; Lohmann & 
Tomasello, 2003; Taumoepeau & Reese, 2013). Lohmann and Tomasello (2003) revealed that 
perspective-shifting discourse contributed to three-year-olds’ improved performance of false-
belief tasks. They pre-tested children in the age range of 39–46 months on false-belief under-
standing using standard tests. Children who failed received different types of intervention and 
were retested using another set of false-belief tests. The largest effect in understanding false 
belief was found when the children were trained in the perspective-shifting discourse about 
deceptive objects (e.g., a pen in the form of a flower). When these objects were given to chil-
dren without communicating about them, no effect on understanding false belief was ob-
served. Ruffman, Perner and Parkin (1999) found that pre-schoolers’ false-belief understand-




ings in conflict situations. These findings support the argument that there is a relationship 
between communication and false-belief understanding. However, it is still unclear whether it 
is children’s experience of engaging in a communicative act with their mothers that is impor-
tant or there are particular aspects of communication that are specifically significant. 
 Research in this area indicates that it is especially communication that takes place in 
the context of positive joint activities that is linked to the development of children’s false-
belief understanding. Dunn et al. (1991) reported that specific aspects of communication be-
tween a mother and a child at 33 months predicted false-belief understanding at 40 months, 
when the communication took place in a warm emotional situation but not when it occurred in 
an intimidating controlling environment. Furthermore, it has been argued that the frequency 
of connected communication reveals the development of false-belief understanding.   
 Ensor and Hughes (2008) defined communication connectedness as the degree with 
which utterances of various speakers are semantically related to each other. Thus, the con-
struct of connectedness provides an index of how well interlocutors are tuned in to each 
other’s talk (Bruner, 1983). Children who engage in frequent and widespread connected 
communications with their friends perform well in false-belief tasks (Dunn & Cutting, 1999). 
Dunn and Brophy (2005) indicated that a low frequency of mother–child connected commu-
nication in “hard-to-manage” pre-schoolers was related to poor false-belief understanding, 
thus indicating a relationship between connectedness in communication and children’s disrup-
tive behaviour problems. Ensor and Hughes (2008) followed up 120 families in a large longi-
tudinal study and assessed the children at two, three and four years of age. At these time 
points, children completed social understanding and verbal ability tests. When the children 
were two years old, mother–child interactions were coded for quantity, connectedness and 
content of mothers’ and children’s talk. If a mother’s utterances were semantically connected 
to the child's prior utterances and she used a mental state reference within these connected 




understanding. It was, therefore, argued that connected conversations provide a fertile context 
for children’s developing false-belief understanding.  
 Ensor and Hughes (2008) stated that a mother’s connectedness accelerated a child’s 
social understanding just as a child’s acquisition of language is enhanced by adults’ sensitivity 
in labelling objects within the child’s focus of attention (Tomasello & Barton, 1994; 
Tomasello & Farrar, 1986). In this case, shared focus in communication highlights similarities 
or differences between the child’s and the parent’s points of view. Furthermore, in connected 
communication, the child and the parent can construct a shared perspective.  
 Despite these valuable findings, reports of associations between communication con-
nectedness, false-belief understanding and social competence have been relatively rare, and 
further research is needed. 
 
2.7 Research questions 
 
 The previous sections of this chapter provided a summary of existing research, and 
probable relations were hypothesised. Despite our understanding that language does affect 
false-belief understanding and social competence, what remains unclear is specific elements 
of language that are crucial and the extent to which they are to the development of false-belief 
understanding and these elements’ relationship to social competence.  
 The goal of the current study is to address these gaps by examining the relationship 
between mental state talk and communication connectedness at the age of two (time 1) and 
three-and-a-half years (time 3) and performance on false-belief understanding and social 
competence at the age of five years (time 4). Furthermore, the relationship between false-
belief understanding and social competence is explored. The following research questions and 




Research question 1: Is the maternal or child’s mental state talk or communication connect-
edness at times 1 and/or 3 associated with the child’s performance of the false-belief task at 
time 4? 
Hypothesis 1: Children who participate more in connected communication and hear more 
mental state terms perform better in a false-belief task than children who participate in less 
connected communication and hear fewer mental state terms.  
Research question 2: Is the maternal or child’s mental state talk or communication connect-
edness at times 1 and/or 3 associated with the child's social competence at time 4? 
Hypothesis 2: Children who exhibit more connected communication and hear more mental 
state terms display better social skills and are socially more competent than children who par-
ticipate in less connected communication and hear fewer mental state terms.  
Research question 3: Is performance of the false-belief task at time 4 associated with the 
child's social competence at time 4? 
Hypothesis 3: Children who perform better in a false-belief task are socially more competent 
than those who perform worse.  
 
The first question addresses whether specific elements of language relate to false-
belief understanding. Specifically, language samples will be analysed for mental state talk and 
communication connectedness to examine whether they affect the development of false-belief 
understanding. Next, to scrutinise the effect of language on social competence, question 2 
examines whether early language abilities including mental state talk and communication 
connectedness may be important for social competence. The last question examines the argu-




done of whether the child’s performance of a false-belief task is related to his or her social 
competence. 
 
2.8 Summary and conclusion 
 
 Up to date, there is no agreed-upon definition of social competence. Global definitions 
focus on the notion of effectiveness within the social context. Furthermore, comprehensive 
models such as the one proposed by Cavell (1990) identify critical social goals along with 
proposed skills and abilities. These models are helpful with regard to the assessment of social 
competence because they separate social skills, social performance and social adjustment. 
Children in need of treatment are identified by their social performance. Intervention, how-
ever, typically focuses on the skill level. Evaluations of effectiveness occur at the perform-
ance and/or adjustment levels. Therefore, assessment would ideally occur on social skills, 
social performance and social adjustment.   
 Having good social skills in the early years seems to be important for social adjust-
ment later in life (Boivin et al., 1995; Coie & Dodge, 1983; Fabes et al., 2005). Various stud-
ies have indicated that children with low social skills were more often rejected by their peers, 
which had a great impact on their social adjustment even in adulthood (Ladd & Asher, 1985; 
Parker & Asher, 1987). Therefore, it is essential to find out more about children’s social de-
velopment and early skills that have an impact on later social development.   
 Considering others’ perspective and understanding that someone can hold a false be-
lief is one of several social skills that are required for one to be socially competent. Earlier on, 
children develop an implicit understanding of false belief, and from the age of four, an ex-
plicit understanding becomes apparent. An explicit understanding is abstract and conscious 
and allows children to explain why someone has a false belief and how that false belief affects 




tence, it is of great interest to further investigate the relationship between false-belief under-
standing and social competence.  
 The findings of longitudinal studies on children with language difficulties have indi-
cated that language problems can be related to problems in social competence, including so-
cial adjustment issues later in life. The main argument put forward is that language is a core 
competence in the development of social skills, in social performance and in being socially 
well adjusted. Further research is required in to determine aspects of language that are neces-
sary for one to be socially competent. It has been argued that attributing a false belief to oth-
ers seems to be a linking ability between specific language skills and social competence. Two 
main language measures seem to be related to the ability to understand that someone is hold-
ing a false belief: mental state talk and the connectedness in the communication between a 
mother and a child.   
 In other words, an environment in which connected communication including mental 
state terms is prevalent seems to support false-belief understanding in young children. There-
fore, in considering the role of language in false-belief understanding, a distinction needs to 
be made between children’s language abilities and the language environment of the commu-
nicative exchange in which children are involved. The social context affects children’s lan-
guage abilities, which seem to affect their environment, in terms of the kinds of semantic in-
put and communication they receive. Considering this, it is surprising that these particular 
links between language, false-belief understanding and social competence in children have 
not been studied in more detail. In other words, specific language assessments may reflect the 
extent to which children's false-belief understanding hinges on their language abilities and 
how this influences their social competence. Specific research questions that relate to these 






 The previous chapter provided information concerning assessments of social compe-
tence and introduced a probable relationship between language, false-belief understanding and 
social competence. The main argument put forward is that language abilities and false-belief 
understanding are important for becoming socially competent. Specific research questions and 
hypotheses were stated. 
 This chapter describes the methods used to address the research questions. Assessment 
tools were chosen with regard to developmental stages and were based on the construct defi-
nitions provided. Structurally, this chapter consists of four main sections with relevant sub-
sections. In the first two sections recruitment processes and participants are introduced. The 
third section and its sub-sections provide further information about how these participants 
were assessed and which measurements were used. Procedures are described in section four. 
 
3.1 Study design 
 
 Ethical approval to conduct the current study was gained from the Human Ethics 
Committee at the University of Canterbury. 
 The families who were participating in the current study were drawn from the longitu-
dinal study of New Zealand children “Learning to Talk” (Klee, Stokes, & Moran, 2015). This 
broader project examined three measures in the search for better predictors of children’s lan-
guage outcomes; verbal short-term memory, short-term vocabulary growth and parents’ con-
cern about their child’s speech and language development. Children were assessed at three 
time points on a battery of assessments. Additional information about this study can be found 




 Participants were recruited through a university research database, doctors’ offices, 
local special education providers, Plunket nurses (the local preschool public health service) 
and early childhood education centres. The initial study sample at time 1, (hereafter, T1) in-
cluded 168 children (96 boys and 72 girls) living in and around Christchurch. The toddlers 
were aged between 24-31 months (M= 26.8, SD= 1.8), with no report of any significant medi-
cal history, any diagnosis known to affect speech, hearing or language development and Eng-
lish as their first language. 
 At time 2 (T2) parents of 163 children participated. At this time children ranged in age 
from 27-36 months (M= 30.3, SD= 1.95). Since the data from this time point is not relevant 
for the current study, T2 will not be further described.  
 At time 3 (T3) 160 families returned to participate in the first follow-up study, demon-
strating an impressive commitment to the study. The children ranged in age from 42-50 
months (M= 45.5, SD= 1.9), with 91 boys and 69 girls. The mean length of time between the 
initial assessment and the first follow-up assessment was 18 months. 
At time 4 (T4) 67 monolingual English speaking pre-schoolers and their mothers liv-
ing in the Canterbury region in New Zealand are involved. Participants of T4 are described in 
detail in the following section. 
 
3.2 Participants  
 
 In 2015 families were invited for the second follow-up study (T4). Since time for the 
current study was limited only families who could be seen from January to November 2015 
were included. Contact was attempted with 135 families. Seven families were not contactable 
because their email addresses and telephone numbers were no longer valid. Twenty-nine 




pate in the second follow-up study as they had moved from the Christchurch region. One fam-
ily couldn’t take part because of health issues, and one family was simply not keen on further 
participation. This left 93 families who visited the Child Language Centre again at T4 and 
participated in the relevant assessments. 
 The current study included only those children for whom transcripts of language sam-
ples were available for ages 24-30 (T1) and 42-48 months (T3). Nine participants had to be 
excluded because a language sample was missing. Language samples of 17 participants in-
cluded more people than just the mother and the child and were therefore excluded as well. 
Having more people in the room clearly changes the communication environment. It is argued 
that a one to one communication has a different dynamic than a setting with three to five peo-
ple.  
 The participants for the current study were 67 children ranged in age from 59-67 
months (M= 63.3, SD= 1.80), with 37 boys and 30 girls. The majority of children in the sam-
ple attended pre-school education day-care at T1 (49, 73%) and all of them at T3 (67, 100%). 
Children who attended pre-school education day-care at T1 averaged 12.3 hours per week at 
their day-care centre. Children who attended pre-school education day-care at T3 averaged 
18.6 hours per week. Over half of the children in the sample were male (37, 55%). A large 
portion of children in the sample were either the first (30, 45%) or second born child in their 
family (26, 39%). The majority of families participating had two children at T3 (40, 60%).  
 Frequencies and percentages for salient demographic characteristics are reported in 
Table 2. These information were gained with a parent questionnaire (PQ) at T1 and T3 which 
was completed by the mother when the children were 24-30 months of age and again when 
they were 42-50 months (see Appendix B). Some of the variables were not repeatedly meas-
ured since they would still be the same over time as for example birth order. Hearing was 




screen (OAE, described in 3.3.2). Results of the hearing screening are also presented in Table 
2.   
Table 2 
Summary of child characteristics  
Variable n % of sample 
Attends pre-school educa-
tion day-care at T1 
  
Yes 49 (Average hours/week: 
12.3) 
73 
No 18 27 
Attends pre-school educa-
tion day-care at T3 
  
Yes 67 (Average hours/week: 
18.6) 
100 
No 0 0 
Child's gender   
Female 30 45 
Male 37 55 
Birth order   
1 30 45 
2 26 39 
3 10 15 
4 1 1 
Number of children in fam-
ily 
  
1 11 17 
2 40 60 
3 14 21 
4 1 1 
5 1 1 
   
Hearing (OAE screen at 
2000, 2500, 3200 and 
4000hz at 50dB): 
  
"Pass" one ear and "refer" 
for the other 
12 18 
"Pass" both ears 49 73 
"Refer" both ears 1 1.5 
"Pass" one ear and no data 
for the other 
4 6 
No results for both ears 1 1.5 





  The education level of the sample was based on the mothers who completed all the 
parent questionnaires at T1 and were combined into categories used by Statistics New Zea-
land (StatisticsNZ, 2016). In comparison with the educational attainment data from the most 
recent national census population of females aged 15-44 years in New Zealand the education 
level of mothers in this sample was much higher. As can be seen in Table 3 a higher percent-
age of mothers are holding university degrees and a lower percentage have no or few qualifi-
cations than in the general population. This is not unlike the situation in many other studies of 
children’s language, but it does mean that the group does not represent the general population. 
Consequently, the study’s finding might not be generalisable to the general population.   
  
Table 3 
Education profile of mothers in the study compared to 15-44 year old females in the popula-
tion 
Education level n Sample % Populationᵃ % 
No qualification 0 0 12.7 
Some secondary education ᵇ 6 9 24.6 
Secondary education certificates and diplomas  ͨ 12 17.9 35.5 
University degrees ͩ 49 73.13 27.1 
Note. ᵃ Source: Statistics New Zealand, customised data received 26 January 2016 ᵇ Includes Level 1-
2 Certificates. ͨ Includes Level 3-4 Certificates and Level 5-6 Diplomas. ͩ Includes undergraduate and 
postgraduate degrees and graduate and postgraduate certificates and diplomas. Adapted from Early 
factors in childhood communication disorders: final project report (p. 7), by T. Klee, S. Stokes and C. 





 Children completed a protocol of assessments at T1, T3 and T4 during their two visits 
to the Child Language Centre (Appendix C) while the parents filled out several question-
naires. In the following only assessments that are relevant for the current study are described. 
An overview of relevant tasks for all time points is provided in Table 4. At T1 and T3 data 




(ROWPVT, Martin & Brownell, 2011) and the parent questionnaire. Additionally, at T1 par-
ents filled out the New Zealand English adaption of the MacArthur Bates Communicative 
Development Inventory (Elaine Reese & Read, 2000). At T4 children were assessed on a 
nonverbal false belief task and on the Clinical Evaluation of Language Fundamentals - Pre-
school, second edition (CELF-P2, Wiig et al., 2004) to measure their general language abili-
ties. Children also participated on the Raven's Coloured Progressive Matrices (CPM, Raven, 
1986) to assess their intellectual capacity. Children's hearing ability was screened using an 
otoacoustic emissions (OAE) test. The parents filled out three questionnaires to provide 
demographic information but also to describe their children's social competence. All these 
assessments are described in detail in the following sub-sections. Testing was conducted in a 
quiet room located in the Child Language Centre. The scores forms for the non-standardised 
measures are included in Appendix D. 
Table 4 
Child and mother measures at T1, T3 and T4 
 Time 1 (24-30 months) Time 3 (42-48 months) Time 4 (59-67 months)  
Child Language Sample Language Sample False belief understand-
ing task 
 
 ROWPVT ROWPVT CELF-P2  
   CPM  
   Hearing Screen  
     
Mother Language Sample Language Sample SDQ  
 Parent Questionnaire Parent Questionnaire SRS-2  
 CDI  Parent Questionnaire  
Note. CELF-P2= Clinical Evaluation of Language Fundamentals - Preschool, Second Edition 
(Wiig, Secord, & Semel, 2004). CDI= MacArthur Bates Communicative Development Inventory: 
Words & Sentences, New Zealand English Adaptation (Reese & Read, 2000). CPM= Coloured 
Progressive Matrices (Raven, 1986). SDQ= Strengths and Difficulties Questionnaire (Goodman, 
1997). SRS-2= Social Responsiveness Scale-Second Edition (Constantino, 2012). ROWPVT= Re-







3.3.1 Demographic information 
 
Parent questionnaire 
 This questionnaire was developed in order to gather information about demographic 
variables and parent concerns about their child’s development. Parents were also asked to 
report about any health problem the child might have and whether any medication or therapy 
has been prescribed. This questionnaire was used at each time but was slightly revised over 
the years to avoid asking the same questions.  
 
3.3.2 Hearing and intellectual capacity 
 
Hearing screening 
 All children were assessed using an Otoacoustic Emissions (OAE) screening in order 
to determine cochlear status. Responses to sound were measured by inserting a small probe 
into the child's ear canal. OAE screening was done at 2000, 2500, 3200 and 4000 Hz at 50 dB. 
 
Raven’s Coloured Progressive Matrices (CPM) 
 The CPM (Raven, 1986) has commonly been used to distinguish between degrees of 
intellectual maturity by quantifying a child’s ability to form comparisons and to reason by 
analogy  (Raven & Court, 1998). It was specifically created for children aged between 5 and 
11 years of age including 36 items divided into three sets of 12 (A, Ab and B). The items are 
brightly coloured illustrations printed in a book to attract and maintain children’s attention. 
Within each set, items are ordered in terms of increasing difficulty. Sets also vary in diffi-
culty, with set B enclosing the most challenging items. For each item the children were shown 




below which would complete the pattern above. The child’s answer was recorded on a scoring 
form which provided scores for each set and as a total.  
 The CPM has been regarded as a culturally fair measure of intellectual functioning for 
both children and adults (Carlson & Jensen, 1981). In normative studies good reliability, test-
retest reliability and high internal consistency and split-half reliability were reported (Cotton 
et al., 2005).   
  
3.3.3 False-belief understanding  
 
 False belief tasks try to determine a child’s ability to understand the contents of an-
other person’s mind without giving the child explicit access to, or explicit statements regard-
ing, the other person’s perspective.  
 Bloom and German (2000) questioned the validity of the widely used standard false-
belief tests, like the “unexpected change of location” task explained in chapter 2, because ad-
ditional task demands like executive skills and processing of linguistic information conceal 
conceptual understanding. In most standard false-belief tasks children are asked a direct ques-
tion about how the mistaken agent will act. When children are asked this test question they 
have to shift from merely observing the test scene to participating in a conversation about it. 
Their own perspective on the scene naturally becomes prominent and must be inhibited to 
allow them to adopt the agent’s perspective. In addition children need to understand the test 
question and select a response. In other words, young children may often fail standard false-
belief tasks because simultaneously executing false false-belief-representation, response-
selection, and response-inhibition processes overwhelms their limited resources (Baillargeon, 
Scott, & He, 2010; De Bruin & Newen, 2012).   
 Nonverbal false-belief tasks on the other hand do not demand linguistic skills and the 




tional processes is drastically reduced. In a nonverbal design, language either is not used or is 
mostly additional to what is mainly a nonlinguistic mode of interaction and presentation.  
 
The competitive nonverbal false-belief task 
 In order to minimise additional task demands a competitive nonverbal false-belief task 
designed by Krachun, Carpenter, Call and Tomasello (2009) was used in this study.  
 For this task a table (100 x 60cm) with a sliding platform in the middle and a plexiglas 
panel with arm holes on each side was used. An opaque screen was put up to block the child’s 
view when needed. Furthermore, colourful stickers and two small identical boxes were used.  
 In two warm up trials the child was introduced to the general procedure and the com-
petitive context was established. The experimenter (myself) put the two boxes next to each 
other onto the sliding platform. She told the child that they were going to play a game in 
which the child could try to win a sticker which is hidden in one of the boxes. The child was 
also told that she needs to be careful because the competitor wants to win the sticker as well. 
While both the child and the competitor were watching the experimenter hid the sticker in one 
box. The experimenter then slid the platform towards the competitor, who reached with effort 
but unsuccessfully for the box with the sticker inside. The platform was then slid over to the 
child who was able to reach for the box and this way win the first sticker. To establish the 
competitive context, the competitor was able to reach the box and win the sticker in a second 
trial. The competitor acted disappointed when the child won the sticker and pleased when she 
did. She often made competitive comments such as “This time I will win the sticker!”  
 After this warm up, a pre-test was given to verify that children could use the competi-
tor’s reach as a cue to the sticker’s location. In these trials, before the experimenter hid the 
sticker in a box, she positioned an opaque screen to block the child’s view of the boxes. The 




could see the competitor’s face over the screen and they observed how the competitor 
watched how the experimenter hid the sticker. The competitor was watching the hiding with 
clear interest, leaning forward, and saying things such as “aha” to show that she paid atten-
tion. She looked straight ahead during the hiding so the child could not use her gaze to infer 
where the sticker was being hidden. The experimenter then removed the screen so that the 
child could see both boxes again. The experimenter slid the platform towards the competitor 
who reached unsuccessfully for the box with the sticker in it. The experimenter then slid the 
box towards the child who could choose and reach a box. When children understood that the 
competitor knew in which box the sticker was because she saw it being hidden, they will 
choose the same box as she did. The children had to pass three trials in a row before the false 
belief was assessed.  
 In the false-belief trials the experimenter was also blocking the child’s view of the 
boxes with the screen and hid the sticker while the competitor was observing. The experi-
menter removed the screen and the competitor immediately turned around and looked in the 
opposite direction. She gave some excuse for doing so like for example to store her sticker or 
to look out the window. In this moment the experimenter got the child’s attention and 
switched the position of the boxes without telling the child in which box the sticker is. During 
this act the experimenter was smiling mischievously and glanced occasionally at the competi-
tor’s back to make sure she didn’t see the switch. The competitor was clearly not attending to 
the experimenter’s actions, muttering to herself and being highly absorbed in her task. The 
experimenter signalled the competitor when she was finished by asking her whether she was 
ready to pick a box. The competitor then returned to her position facing the child again. The 
experimenter slid the platform first in the direction of the competitor who reached for the 
empty box with effort but unsuccessfully. The platform was slid to the side of the child while 
the competitor was still reaching for the box. Children who recognised the competitor’s false 




correct box were allowed to keep the sticker; otherwise the experimenter slid the platform 
back to the competitor who took the sticker. The competitor showed obvious surprise when 
the location of the sticker was revealed. Even though the task was nonverbal, the experi-
menter and the competitor chatted naturally with each other and with the child throughout. 
They were carful not to refer to the competitor’s belief states. 
 Location of the sticker was randomly determined with the restriction that the sticker 
could not be hidden in the same box for more than two consecutive trials.  
 The main measure was whether or not children chose the correct box. Choice was de-
fined as the box children were touching or trying to open by the time the experimenter fin-
ished sliding the platform over to them. Children had to pass at least 3 out of 4 false-belief 
trials in order to pass the false-belief understanding task.  
 
3.3.4 Social competence 
 
 In the past, children were mostly assessed on how they performed on tasks using ap-
propriate social skills as a way of drawing conclusions about social competence. According to 
the tripartite model proposed by Cavell (1990), introduced in chapter 2.1, it seems to be in-
adequate to only assess specific social skills like perspective taking, to predict the quality of a 
child’s social competence. Cavell (1990) suggests that researchers and practitioners incorpo-
rate assessments of not only specific behavioural skills across different types of social situa-
tions but also indexes of social adjustment such as peer acceptance, loneliness and self-
esteem. Therefore, two parent questionnaires were used additionally to retrieve more informa-






Strengths and Difficulties Questionnaire (SDQ) 
 The SDQ (Goodman, 1997) is a widely used well-established behavioural screening 
questionnaire appropriate for 3-16 year olds. For this study the SDQ version for 4 to 10 year 
olds was used. Parents completed this one page questionnaire for assessing the psychological 
adjustment of their children. The SDQ asks about 25 characteristics, including competencies 
or strengths in addition to assessing problems. It is using a three point Likert-scale, ranging 
through ‘not true’, ‘somewhat true’ and ‘certainly true’ to indicate how far each characteristic 
applies to their child. The 25 items are divided between five scales of five items each, gener-
ating scores for emotional symptoms (e.g., “Many worries or often seems worried”), conduct 
problems (e.g., “Generally well behaved, usually does what adults request”), hyperactivity 
(e.g., “Restless, overactive, cannot stay still for long”), peer problems (e.g., “Has at least one 
good friend”) and prosocial behaviour (e.g., “Helpful if someone is hurt, upset or feeling ill”). 
All except prosocial behaviour are summed to generate a total difficulties score, indicating the 
severity and the content of the psychosocial problems. The prosocial scale indicates the 
amount of prosocial characteristics a child shows (Goodman, 1997). Screening cut-offs for 
categorical scores (abnormal, borderline and normal) are provided. The SDQ shows strong 
psychometric properties and correlations with other measures of child psychopathology were 
high (see Stone, Otten, Engels, Vermulst, & Janssens, 2010 for a review). The SDQ has been 
normed from a large sample including 10,438 children in the United Kingdom.  
 
Social Responsiveness Scale - Second edition (SRS-2) 
 The SRS-2 (Constantino, 2012) is a measure that identifies social impairment associ-
ated with autism spectrum disorder (ASD) and quantifies its severity in an age range from 2.5 
to 99 years. In this study the SRS-2 version for 4-18 year olds was used. Parents were asked 




items. Five subscales are provided: Social Awareness (e.g., "Is aware of what others are think-
ing or feeling"), Social Cognition (e.g., "Doesn't recognise when others are trying to take ad-
vantage of him or her"), Social Communication (e.g., "Avoids eye contact or has unusual eye 
contact"), Social Motivation (e.g., "Would rather be alone than with others") and Autistic 
Mannerisms (e.g., "Has an unusually narrow range of interests"). The subscales corresponding 
to the two symptom domains Social Communication and Restricted Interest and Repetitive 
Behaviour. Each item is scored on a 4 point Likert-scale, ranging through ‘not true’, ‘some-
times true’, ‘often true’ and ‘almost always true’. Upon completion of all items raw total and 
subscale scores are calculated for the specific gender. SRS-2 total raw scores range from 0 to 
95, with higher scores indicating increased social impairment. Cronbach’s alpha scores indi-
cate that the overall SRS scale has good internal consistency (a = .94 in males; a = .93 in fe-
males, parent rated) (Constantino & Gruber, 2005). Norms are provided for each form based 
on a sample of 1906 individuals.  
 
3.3.5 Linguistic abilities 
 
Clinical Evaluation of Language Fundamentals - Preschool, second edition (CELF-P2) 
 
 The CELF-P2 (Wiig et al., 2004) evaluates a broad range of language skills in pre-
school children age 3-6 years. This test includes a variety of subtests that provide in-depth 
assessment of a child's language skills. The subtests include concepts and following direc-
tions, word structure, expressive vocabulary, recalling sentences, sentences structure, basic 
concepts, recalling sentences in context, word classes and phonological awareness. Together 
they are used to derive four index scores: expressive and receptive language, language content 




 Norms were derived from 800 children from wide-ranging geographic locations, age, 
gender, race and education of primary caregiver living in the United States of America. Inter-
nal consistency reliability was reported as .73-.96 and test-retest reliability for subtests as .77-
.92 and as .91-.94 for composite scores. Concurrent validity was reported to be moderate to 
high for composite scores and for subtests. Sensitivity of the Core Language Score was re-
ported as .85; the specificity as .82 (Brassard & Boehm, 2007). 
 
MacArthur Bates Communicative Development Inventory: Words & Sentences (CDI), 
New Zealand English adaptation 
 The CDI: Words and Sentences (Fenson et al., 1993) is a well-established and widely-
used parent report measure of expressive vocabulary and grammatical development for chil-
dren aged 16 to 30 months. Reese and Read (2000) adapted the CDI for use with children in 
New Zealand due to  differences between New Zealand and American English. Forty-one 
words in the vocabulary section were changed by substituting the equivalent word used in 
New Zealand (e.g., stroller - pushchair, diaper - nappy). Parents were asked to indicate 
whether their child produced any of the 680 words listed  by checking the words on the form. 
These words are organised into 22 semantic categories (e.g., actions, body parts, animals, 
food and drink, clothing, etc) (see Appendix E). The CDI provides a range of scores on differ-
ent aspects of expressive language development, however the only measure used in the cur-
rent study was total words produced. The CDI has high test-retest reliability, good concurrent 
and predictive validity (Buehler, Klee, Stokes, & Gibson, 2016; Fenson et al., 1993; Reese & 
Read, 2000). Norms were derived from a large sample of 2156 children from wide-ranging 
sociodemographic backgrounds living in the United States of America. New Zealand norms 





Receptive One Word Picture Vocabulary Test (Fourth edition) (ROWPVT-4) 
 The ROWPVT-4 (Martin & Brownell, 2011) is a measure of receptive vocabulary 
designed for participants of an wide age range from 2 through to 80+ years. The test consists 
of 190 items presented in a developmental sequence that reflects the concepts with which 
people currently have experience through home, school or media. Children were asked to 
point to one out of four coloured pictures which matched the word spoken by the examiner. 
The test began based on the chronological age of the children and was discontinued when the 
ceiling was reached. Because this test was developed for American children, “cookies” was 
changed to “biscuits” and “mailman” to “postman” in accordance with New Zealand English 
vocabulary. Since “baseball” is not a common sport in New Zealand it was changed to 
“rugby”. This test provides both raw scores and standard scores. 
 Internal consistency coefficient alphas range from .95 to .98 across age groups. Test-
retest (average of 20 days) reliability for the entire sample was reported from .87 to .93 
(Brassard & Boehm, 2007).  Concurrent validity was reported to be moderate in the manual 
(Martin & Brownell, 2011). The ROWPVT-4 was normed from a large sample of 2,327 indi-
viduals from 32 states in the United States of America. 
 
3.3.6 Language samples 
 Spontaneous play-based language samples of the children and their mothers were ob-
tained at T1 and T3. These interactions were filmed and transcribed using SALT (Miller & 
Chapman, 2012). All the transcriptions were done by a research assistant and a PhD candidate 
(myself) both trained in sample segmentation and coding.  
 Interjudge agreement using language samples from T1 and T3 was examined using a 
point-by-point agreement calculation. 10% of the language samples which were transcribed 




word by word, utterance segmentation and mental state terms comparison. The general crite-
ria for utterance segmentation were taken from Fletcher and Garman (1988), Garman (1989) 
and Johnson (1986). Additionally, 'yes' and 'no' and their various representations were tran-
scribed as separate utterances unless intonation indicated that it was part of the utterance (e.g., 
'no mummy'). Utterances which were separated by a brief pause or hesitation but were gram-
matically related to the previous utterance were transcribed as one ('I’ll have a cupcake and 
dad can have the lettuce (Pause) and the cucumber'). Utterances including a tag question were 
transcribed as one utterance (e.g., 'that's where we put the pots isn't it?'). 











Number of agreements + disagreements 
  
In this formula, the “number of agreements” used were defined in terms of the variable of 
interest. At T1 interjudge word by word agreement was 88.59%, utterance segmentation 
agreement was 96.55% and mental state term agreement was 92.25%. At T3 interjudge word 
by word agreement was 91.63%, utterance segmentation agreement was 98.24% and mental 





Table 5  
Summary of interjudge agreement   




Mental State Term 
Agreement 
Time 1 P017 84.78% 94.87% 83.35% 
 P037 85.22% 95.73% 94.29% 
 P049 89.77% 95.73% 93.35% 
 P056 88.42% 97.94% 90.24% 
 P063 94.77% 98.95% 100% 
 Mean 88.59% 96.55% 92.25% 
     
Time 3 P015 95.39% 98.71% 93.10% 
 P034 95.26% 97.64% 95.12% 
 P046 94.19% 99.39% 72.22% 
 P048 94.91% 98.28% 100% 
 P079 90.45% 98.13% 94.74% 
 P080 79.56% 97.28% 97.02% 
 Mean 91.63% 98.24% 92.03% 
 
Child and maternal mental state talk 
 The transcripts were coded using SALT (Miller & Chapman, 2012) for all children’s 
and mothers' utterances containing mental state terms. Each category was then expressed as a 
proportion of the 20 minutes observation, such as a proportion of total number of different 
words uttered by the speaker or of total number of uttered turns. 
 Mental state terms included all nouns, verbs, adjectives or adverbs describing one of  
four categories of mental states: physiological, emotional, desire, and cognitive. Physiological 
state words were defined as references to internal states of body and included words such as 
'hot’ and ‘sleepy’. Emotional terms were defined as references to affective states including 
words like ‘happy’ and ‘sad’. Words such as ‘want’ and ‘need’ were categorised as general 
references to desire. Cognitive state terms were defined as referring to thoughts, memories, 
reasoning, knowledge or other forms of cognitive mental activity, such as verbs like ‘think’, 




(e.g., 'clever') and other terms. A detailed summary of the terms included in the different cod-
ing categories is shown in Table 6.  
 The general criteria for coding were taken from Bartsch and Wellman (1995) and 
Ruffman et al. (2002). In line with Bartsch and Wellman (1995) utterances including mental 
state terms were examined to determine if the speaker genuinely referred to a mental state, 
rather than just using the term in a conversational fashion. For example, ‘think’ terms that 
principally could mean ‘yes’ or ‘no’  (e.g., ‘I think so’, ‘I don't think so’), and used for turn 
taking (e.g., ‘what do you think?’) were not coded as referring to mental states. Similarly, 
‘know’ terms used to redirect the listener's attention (e.g., ‘know what?’) or for soliciting a 
response from a conversational partner in order to keep talk going (e.g., ‘do you know what I 
did yesterday?’) were coded as conversational rather than genuine uses. Furthermore, not 
coded were ‘I don’t know’ and ‘I know’ responses which did not elaborate on what was un-
known and only contained these three words. Their use could possibly just mean ‘I can’t an-
swer’ (Bartsch & Wellman, 1995; Shatz et al., 1983). References such as ‘I don’t know what 
that is’ were included since knowledge about a particular object was described by the speaker.  
 ‘Just pretend’ or ‘It's just pretend’ without further explanation were not coded since it 
could be just used to prevent a child from a specific behaviour like taking toys in his mouth or 
describe an object rather than a mental state. Utterances like ‘I pretend it's vegemite’, ‘We can 
pretend it's bread’ or ‘Like the pretend table’ on the other hand are reflecting a mental state 
and were therefore coded. When coding for desire terms Bartsch and Wellmans’ (1995) crite-
ria were also followed. Not counted as genuine mental utterances were terms used for social 
convention (e.g., ‘I don’t care’) and for objectless statements for desire (e.g., ‘I wanna’). Con-
text was used to determine whether an utterance including the term 'like' was truly intended to 
refer to a desire like ‘I want that’ or to refer to a state of enjoyment. An example for a desire 
reference using 'like' is 'I would like a cup of tea' whereas 'I like playing with these toys' 




 Utterances that exactly and immediately repeated one’s own or the other person’s 
mental state utterance were not included in the analysis. Further excluded were all mental 
state terms that were mentioned in memorised songs or rhymes, such as ‘Happy Birthday’. If 
utterances were unintelligible except for the mental state term, they were excluded because it 
was unclear whether the child or the mother is referring to a genuine mental state.  
 Inter-rater reliability using the coded transcripts were examined. Seven randomly cho-
sen transcripts of the 67 at T1 and T3 were re-coded by a research assistant. Inter-rater agree-
ment for mental state terms said by the child was 86.26% at T1 and 93.1% at T3. Inter-rater 







Coding examples of mental state words taken from the transcripts 




sleep, asleep, wake up, awake, died/dead, all bet-
ter, okay, toilet references, hot, broken 
  
"Is the baby 
asleep?" 
"She is dead." 
"Do you need to 
poo?" 
 
Emotion happy, pleased, not pleased, annoyed, hurtful, 
bored, not happy, unhappy, feel [feel bad], sad, 
upset, fed up, miserable, cross, grumpy, angry, 
mad, scared, frightened, afraid, worried, shocked, 
shy, surprised, pleased, enjoy, excited, fun, inter-
ested, frustrated, missed, disgusted, okay [feel 
okay], good [feel good], better [feel better], disap-
pointed, mad, cry, relax, like, love, proud 
 
 "The boy is really 
happy" 
"She is too excited." 
"He does look 
grumpy."  
"This is fun." 
"I love chocolate!" 
"I like this teddy 
bear." 
 
Desire want, hope, wish, like, don’t like, love, dream, 
prefer, keen on, need, hate, fancy, 
 "I want this car." 
"He wants to go to 
the farm." 
"He would like 
some grass." 
"I need that baby." 
 
Cognition think, know, believe, expect, wonder, remember, 
guess, dream, forget, mean [I mean that], real, 
understand, remind, realise, have in mind, hard 
[difficult], pretend, make believe, bet, forget, sure, 
understand, concentrate, assure, distract, figure, 
idea, ignore, imagine, interest, learn, recognise, 
trust, decide, clever 
 "She is thinking 
hard" 
"I think that's a 
kitchen" 
"I don't know if I 
can open this" 
"How do you know 
it’s his"? 
"He expects her to 
cry” 






Child and maternal communication connectedness 
 The same transcripts were coded for communication connectedness using a system 
introduced by Dunn and colleagues (e.g., Dunn & Cutting, 1999) and refined by Ensor and 
Hughes (2008). Adopting procedures from the Ensor and Hughes (2008) study, each tran-
script was divided into conversational turns. A turn was defined as utterances of one speaker 
bounded by another speaker’s utterances (Shatz & Gelman, 1973) or a significant pause of 
five seconds or more. Each conversational turn of the mother and the child was assigned to 
one of the following four codes: 
1.  Connected: Speaker’s utterance is semantically related to the other speaker’s previous 
verbal turn.   
2. Initiation: Speaker initiates a new topic that is both unrelated to the other speaker’s previ-
ous turn and successful in eliciting a semantically related response from the other speaker.  
3. Failed: Speaker’s turn is directed to the other speaker but fails to prompt a semantically 
related response.  
4. Unclear: Speaker’s utterance was inaudible or unintelligible and therefore not able to as-
sign to a code.  
 Each category was then expressed as a proportion of the 20 minutes observation, such 
as a proportion of speaker turns. 
 Table 7 shows a conversational extract, coded for quantity and quality. The child’s 
first and second turn were coded as initiation because the child initiated new topics and the 
mother produced a semantically related response. Accordingly, the mother’s first two turns 
were coded as connected. The child’s third turn is considered as connected because he obvi-
ously responded to the mother’s question. The child’s fourth turn was coded as failed because 
the mother did not reply to the child’s question but initiated a new question. Since the child 
did reply to this new initiation the mother’s fourth turn was coded as initiation and the child’s 




a pause of more than five seconds. The mother’s fifth turn includes a related response and is 
therefore coded as connected. 
 
Table 7 
Coding example of conversational extract  
Turn 
Number 
Utterances Quality (of turn)  
1 C what 's that stream? Initiation 
1 M {ah} the stream? Connected 
 M {oh} it 's just a stream.  
 M it 's coming under a bridge.   
 M it's just a stream that 's going past I think.  
2 C what 's that? Initiation 
2 M what 's what? Connected 
 M {oh} what does it look like to you?  
3 C kitchen. Connected 
3 M yeah. Connected 
 M it 's something like a kitchen.  
4 C what 's that green thing? Failed 
4 M do you need to go to the toilet? Initiation 
5 C no.  Connected 
 C don’t need to.  
 (Pause of 7 seconds)  
6 C a banana! Initiation 
5 M yes. Connected 
 M it is a banana.  
Note. C= child; M= mother 
 
 A 'trumping system' (Ensor & Hughes, 2008) was applied to the four coding variables 
of communication behaviour, so that when a conversational turn could be coded in two cate-
gories, certain categories superseded others. The trumping rule was developed on the grounds 




lighted to be significant. Therefore, it was important to code all connected turns and hence 
these turns superseded all other categories. Thus, if a turn could be coded as either connected 
or failed it was always coded as connected. For example, if the beginning of a turn was clearly 
connected to the previous one and followed by an utterance that could be considered as failed 
the turn was still coded as connected:  
M would you like some tea [initiation]. 
C no [connected]. 
C you want some? 
M look at that! 
 A trumping system was also used such that turns could be categorised as either failed, 
unclear or initiation were always coded as initiation. For example if utterances in a turn are 
unintelligible followed by a clear initiation than the turn was coded as initiation:  
M what does the horse do? 
C X (unintelligible). 
C the cow is in the stable [initiation]. 
M the cow is locked in [connected]? 
 Table 8 and 9 provide additional criteria for the coding process which are illustrated 
with examples.  
 Inter-rater reliability coding was assessed by two independent researches. Seven ran-
domly chosen transcripts of the 67 at each T1 and T3 were coded simultaneously. Inter-rater 
agreement for turns uttered by the child was 91.55% at T1 and 95.53% at T3. Inter-rater 




Coding criteria and examples of connected turns taken from the transcripts 
Criteria  
Turns were always considered as connected when… 
 Example 
…they were semantically related.  C I have a cup of tea.  
M you do have a cup of tea 
[connected]. 
 




C she is eating. 
 
…they consisted of a clarifying term like “hm?”, “par-
don?”, "eh?", “huh?”, "yeah?", "really?". This could 
stand for “What was that?/What did you say?”. 
 M what ‘s the baby gonna do 
on the toilet? 
C wee [connected]. 
M hm [connected]? 
C wee [connected]. 
 
C X [unclear]. 
M pardon [connected]? 
C milk [connected]. 
 
…they were a reaction of a call.  C mum? 
M yeah [connected]. 
 
…they were addressed to the other person in order to 
thank them. 
 C there you go. 
M thank you [connected]. 
 
…they were answering a question.  M do you want a piece of 
bread?  
C no [connected].  
C I hurt my head.  
 
…they were repetitions or extensions.  C no.  
M no [connected]. 
 
C boy. 
M the boy [connected]. 
 
…they were semantically related even after a longer 
break. 
 M do you wanna see these 
animal/s? 
: :05 
C what animal/s [connected]. 
 
…they include praise following a verbally statement but 
not for a general action. 
 C found him. 
M good one [connected]. 
 
C I did it! 
M well done [connected]. 
 
C the pot.  
C the [failed]> 
M good girl [failed].  





…they provide a feedback to an utterance with a 
prompt. 
 M sit on the~ 
C chair [connected]. 
 
…the child said or asked for something the mother told 
him/her to do. 
 M go and ask Dora. 
C Dora want cake [connected]  
 
M do you wanna see if Dora 
wants some tea? 
C tea [connected]? 
 
…they confirmed the previous uttered turn.  M cup of tea [initiation]? 
C mhm [connected].  
M alright [connected]. 
 
M does Boots have milk [ini-
tiation]? 
C yep [connected].  
M ok [connected]. 
 
C another car [initiation].  
C this car. 
M cool [connected].  
 
...they included a ‘yes’ or ‘no’ reaction even if the pre-
vious turn was unclear or unintelligible.  
 M that 's a good idea. 
C X [unclear]. 
M yeah [connected]. 
 
…they were clearly relating to a previous turn even 
though they are not semantically related.  
 C help [initiation]. 
M I don't think that wee man 
fits on there sweetheart [con-
nected]. 
 
C and that one not go open 
like this. 
M hang on [connected]. 







General coding criteria and examples of turns taken from the transcripts 
Criteria  Examples 
The first turn in a transcript was always considered as 
an initiation if a related response was following or failed 
if there was no related response following. 
 
 M what is this [initiation]? 
C a cow [connected]. 
 
C there is a car [failed]. 
M blow your nose. 
 
If a turn got abandoned or interrupted it was still coded.   M look! 
M there is a frog in the bus. 
C a frog in> [connected]. 
M and there is a kitchen [ini-
tiation]. 
 
C teddy mummy [initiation]. 
M anyth* [unclear]> 
C teddy [initiation]. 
 
Overlaps were coded.   M we need to stay in here 
sweetheart. 
C <get coffee> [failed]. 
M <come back in here> {IA}. 
M right. 
M do you wanna <help me 
make it> [failed]? 
C <this> coffee [initiation]. 
C (um) yeah.  
 
The turn following after a pause longer than 5 seconds 
was considered as a new turn and got coded accord-
ingly.   
 M does the bus make any 
sounds [failed]? 
; :05 
M did you see the cow [initia-
tion]? 
C yeah [connected]. 
 
Playing sounds or routinized language were only coded 
if they acted as a response or as an initiation but not if 
they were just playing sounds in between utterances. 
 M what do we sing when it ‘s 
your birthday? 
C {sings birthday song} [con-
nected].  
 
M how does the cow make 
[initiation]? 





C {quack} [initiation]. 
M yeah [connected]. 
M a duck.  
 
Other sounds which were not communicative were not 
coded and treated like pauses. 
 C open this [failed].  
M {oh}. 
C open it [initiation]. 
M alright [connected]. 
 
Some turns were not clear to interpret and were there-
fore coded as unclear.  
 M what else could you have 
in your sandwich? 
M tomato? 
C you can't have them [un-
clear]. 
M tomato on toast [unclear]? 
C all over there [unclear]. 
 
 
‘Look!’ was coded as initiation or as connected if there 
was an explanation following on what was looked at. If 
it was said without further information it was coded as 
unclear. 
 C I want this.  
C look [initiation]! 
M it 's a chopping board 
[connected].  
 
M Look [unclear]! 
C I need car. 
 
 
3.4 Procedures  
 
Time 1 
 Previous to their first visit to the Child Language Centre at the University of Canter-
bury parents received a booklet containing general information regarding the study and a con-
sent form, along with a parent questionnaire and a copy of the New Zealand version of the 
CDI. Parents were asked to carefully read the information and either send or bring the docu-




 The initial assessment required two visits to the Child Language Centre where children 
completed a protocol of 13 assessments in a quiet room usually with a parent present. Most of 
the tasks at this time were not relevant for the current study except the parent questionnaire, 
the CDI, the ROWPVT and the language sample described in the previous section. 
 Spontaneous play-based language samples of the children and their mothers were ob-
tained at T1. Participants spent around 20 minutes in a quiet room at the Child Language Cen-
tre and played together with a set of toys provided. The same instructions were given to all 
participants shortly before starting the recording. Mothers were told to play with their child as 
they would at home and that there was no need to get the child to say specific words or to do 
specific things. These interactions were filmed and audio recorded. The video cameras were 
wall mounted and had pan/tilt motion and zoom capabilities. Beyerdynamic boundary micro-
phones were set into the ceiling in the centre of the clinic rooms and were used for the audio 
recording. These language samples were transcribed starting when the examiner left the room 
and closed the door. Transcriptions were done using the Systematic Analysis of Language 
Transcription software (SALT; Miller & Chapman, 2012).  
 After the first session the child could choose a book out of three. After the second ses-
sion the parent was given the $20 voucher for the mall and a $10-20 petrol voucher to thank 
them for participating. If there were any concerns about their child’s development, these were 
discussed at this point and referrals were suggested. 
  
Time 3 
 The same participants were invited to take part in the first follow-up study at T3 con-
sisting of two sessions. Procedure of T3 was very similar to T1. Target reassessment dates 
were set 18 months after the date on the child’s CDI questionnaires filled out by their parents 
at T2. Parents were contacted two to three weeks before this date to ask if they would further 




 As at T1 parents signed the consent form and completed the parent questionnaire. The 
children were assessed on a battery of several assessments. For the current study only the lan-
guage sample and the ROWPVT was of importance. They were gained using the same proce-
dure as at T1.  
 Children again received a book and parents a $20 voucher at a local shopping mall and 
a $10 petrol voucher. If there were any concerns about their child’s development, these were 
discussed at this point and referrals were suggested. 
 
Time 4 
 All families who participated previously in the first follow-up study (T3) were con-
tacted by either mail or email. Parents were invited for further participation and received an 
information sheet about what the study involved (Appendix F). Parents who were interested in 
participating in the second follow-up study contacted the research team to schedule two ap-
pointments. The mean length of time between the first session of the first follow-up study and 
the first session of the second follow-up study was 18 months.  
 Parents brought their children to the Child Language Centre for two 1.5 hour sessions 
approximately 10 days apart (range = 1 day to 5 weeks). Each session lasted from 30 to 90 
minutes depending on the number of tasks in which the child was willing to participate. 
Signed parental consent was gained for all participants (Appendix G). The parents (usually 
the mother) filled out the questionnaires during the first session while most of the relevant 
tasks for the current study were assessed in the second appointment. The nonverbal false be-
lief task was often assessed at the beginning of the second session since children were very 
motivated and opened up a lot during this task. Some children were quite shy since they had 
not met the research team before. The nonverbal task allowed them to get to know them in a 




 All sessions were video and audio recorded. Children again received a book and par-
ents a $20 voucher at a local shopping mall and a $10 petrol voucher. If there were any con-




 In the previous chapter participants, measurements and procedures used to address the 
stated research questions were described. 
 This chapter reports on the statistical analyses that were conducted in order to answer 
these research questions. The results are broken down into five sections. First, descriptive 
statistics for all mother and child variables measured at T1 (24-30 months), T3 (42-48 
months) and T4 (59-67 months) are provided. Second, data transformations and outliers are 
described. Third, correlation analysis are introduced. Fourth, specific results addressing the 
main research questions are summarized. Finally, secondary analyses which address further 
questions related to the main research questions are summarized.  
 
4.1 Descriptive statistics 
 
Mother and child variables at time 1 and time 3 
 In total 67 language samples of child-mother interactions were analysed at T1 and T3. 
A turn was defined as utterances of one speaker bounded by another speaker’s utterances 
(Shatz & Gelman, 1973) or a significant pause of five seconds or more. The mean number of 
mother turns at T1 was 134.13 (SD= 134.13) and 135.33 (SD= 39.19) at T3. The mean num-
ber of children's turns was 126.02 (SD= 39.52) at T1 and 134.73 (SD= 39.78) at T3. To help 




respectively. For example, for communication connectedness the number of turns that were 
related to previous turns was divided by the total number of turns the mother or the child pro-
duced during the spontaneous play situation at T1 and T3. Turns were considered as related 
when they included terms which are in the same semantic field, when they were based on the 
same topic, when one speaker was answering a question of the other or when they included a 
clarifying term. Additional examples of related terms can be find in Chapter 3. In addition, 
maternal and child use of mental state words were analysed as a proportion of number of 
completed words. Completed words were counted using SALT (Miller & Chapman, 2012). 
They were defined as complete and intelligible words, meaning that incomplete and unintelli-
gible words were excluded from the analysis. The mean number of mother completed words 
at T1 was 1101.17 (SD= 347.33) and 1065.61 (SD= 417.98) at T3. The mean number of chil-
dren completed words at T1 was 380.18 (SD= 217.98) and 811.09 (SD= 310.07) at T3. For 
mental state words the number of references to a category of mental state as well as the total 
reference to mental states was divided by the number of total completed words by the mother 
and the child at T1 and T3. Table 10 provides descriptive statistics for communication con-
nectedness and Table 11 for maternal and child use of mental state words during their sponta-
neous play at T1 and T3. 
 
Table 10 
Descriptive statistics for measures of communication connectedness at T1 and T3 
  Measure  M  SD  Range 
Mothers T1  Number of turns  134.13  33.53  50-222 
  Connected turns  71.93 (0.53)  29.19  5-138 
Children T1  Number of turns  126.02  39.52  10-222 
  Connected turns  59.2 (0.45)  28.45  3-144 
Mothers T3  Number of turns  135.33  39.19  42-237 
  Connected turns  77.15 (0.58)  25.99  14-127 
Children T3  Number of turns  134.73  39.78  28-247 
  Connected turns  68.22 (0.49)  29.45  10-163 





Descriptive statistics for measures of mental state words at T1 and T3 
  Measure  M  SD  Range 
Mothers T1  Number of completed words  1101.17  347.33  471-2510 
(n=67)  Physiological reference  3.63 (0.00)  3.63  0-23 
  Desire reference  12.70 (0.01)  6.86  3-33 
  Cognitive reference  11.34 (0.01)  8.27  0-48 
  Emotion reference  1.99 (0.00)  2.39  0-14 
  Total Mental State words  29.66 (0.03)  13.49  7-93 
Children T1  Number of completed words  380.18  217.98  12-1095 
(n=67)  Physiological reference  1.84 (0.01)  2.64  0-12 
  Desire reference  2.09 (0.00)  3.36  0-18 
  Cognitive reference  0.37 (0.00)  0.85  0-5 
  Emotion reference  0.72 (0.00)  1.49  0-9 
  Total Mental State words  5.01 (0.01)  5.41  0-23 
Mothers T3  Number of completed words  1065.61  417.98  213-2093 
(n=67)  Physiological reference  3.45 (0.00)  3.07  0-15 
  Desire reference  10.82 (0.01)  6.33  0-25 
  Cognitive reference  15.72 (0.01)  9.94  0-53 
  Emotion reference  3.19 (0.00)  3.14  0-16 
  Total Mental State words  33.18 (0.03)  16.28  1-88 
Children T3  Number of completed words  811.09  310.07  218-1620 
(n=67)  Physiological reference  3.22 (3.99)  3.49  0-15 
  Desire reference  8.82 (0.01)  6.66  0-31 
  Cognitive reference  3.82 (0.00)  4.15  0-18 
  Emotion reference  1.97 (0.00)  3.26  0-19 
  Total Mental State words  17.84 (0.02)  12.26  0-63 
Note. Proportions are shown in parentheses. 
  
 Expressive vocabulary was assessed with the New Zealand adaption of the parental 
questionnaire CDI at T1. The measure used in the current study was total words produced. 
The mean number of words produced by children at T1 was 349 (SD= 182.20). Receptive 
vocabulary was assessed with the ROWPVT at T1 and T3. Children were asked to point to 
one out of four coloured pictures which matched the word spoken by the examiner. The mean 
number of correct words matched to a picture was 32.40 (SD= 10.17) at T1 and 61.18 (SD= 
12.08) at T3. Descriptive statistics for children's expressive vocabulary at T1 and their recep-





Table 12  
Descriptive statistics for measures of expressive and receptive vocabulary at T1 and T3 
  Measure  M  SD  Range 
CDI T1  Expressive vocabulary  349.39  182.20  11-638 
ROWPVT T1  Receptive vocabulary  32.40  10.17  5-53 
ROWPVT T3  Receptive vocabulary  61.18  12.08  36-91 
Note. CDI= MacArthur Bates Communicative Development Inventory: Words & Sentences (CDI), 
New Zealand English adaptation (Fenson et al., 1993), ROWPVT= Receptive One Word Picture 
Vocabulary Test  (Martin & Brownell, 2011) 
 
 
Mother and child variables at time 4 
 At T4 30 children passed the nonverbal false belief task (45%), and 37 children did not 
pass the task (55%). Table 13 provides descriptive statistics for children's social competence 
measured by the Strength and Difficulty Questionnaire (SDQ) and the Social Responsiveness 
Scale (SRS-2) at T4. One mother didn't complete the SRS-2. 
 
Table 13 
Descriptive statistics for measures of children's social competence at T4   
PQ Measure M SD Range 
SDQ (n=67) Emotional Symptoms 1.36 1.57 0-7 
 Conduct Problems 1.05 1.33 0-5 
 Hyperactivity 2.57 2.13 0-9 
 Peer Problems 0.82 1.29 0-6 
 Prosocial Behaviour 8.39 1.71 4-10 
 Externalising 3.62 3.16 0-13 
 Internalising 2.18 2.29 0-9 
 Total Difficulties 5.80 4.63 0-20 
SRS-2 (n=66) Social Awareness 5.01 2.47 0-10 
 Social Cognition 3.79 3.53 0-14 
 Social Communication 7.27 5.72 0-25 
 Social Motivation 4.85 4.24 0-18 
 Restricted Interests and Repetitive Behavior 2.58 3.03 0-14 
 Social Communication and Interaction 20.88 12.97 0-59 
 SRS-2 Total Raw Scores 23.76 15.16 1-73 
 SRS-2 Total T Score 46.80 6.09 38-66 
Note. PQ= Parent Quesionnaire, SDQ= Strength and Difficulty Questionnaire, SRS-2= Social Respon-




 General language characteristics are based on scores of the CELF-P2 assessed at T4 
and are presented in Table 14. The mean standard score of core language abilities for the chil-
dren in this study was 113.61 (SD = 14.64). The majority of children (35, 52%) received an 
core language score above the defined average range (86-114 scores) while 28 (42%) of chil-
dren were within the average range. Only 4 children (6%) performed in a range below aver-
age. The mean expressive language score was 111.91 (SD = 15.36). The majority of children 
(33, 50%) reached a score within the average range, while 4 children (6%) performed below 
and 29 (44%) above average. Mean score of the receptive language was 109.96 (SD = 14.37). 
Most of the children (34, 51%) achieved scores within the average range (86-114), 3 children 
(4%) performed within the low development range and 30 (45%) performed above the aver-
age range.  
  
Table 14  
Descriptive statistics for measures of child language assessed with the CELF-P2 at T4  
Measure  M  SD  Range  
Expressive Language Index standard score  111.91  15.36  66-142  
Receptive Language Index standard score  109.96  14.37  76-136  
Language Content Index standard score  114.97  16.62  72-145  
Language Structure Index standard score  110.49  14.11  69-134  
Core Language Score standard score  113.61  14.64  77-142  
Note. n= 67 for standard scores of Receptive Language Index, Language Content Index and Core Lan-
guage. For one child there is no data on the Expressive Language Index and on the Language Structure 
Index. Therefore, for these two measures n= 66. CELF-P2= Clinical Evaluation of Language Funda-
mentals - Preschool, second edition (Wiig et al., 2004). 
  
 General intellectual capacity of the sample, composed of 67 children, was assessed via 
administration of the Raven Coloured Progressive Matrices (CPM). CPM consists of 36 items 
in three sets of 12. The mean of the number of correct items of total 36 was 19.63 (SD = 
3.77). Compared to normative data from Australia (Raven & Court, 1998) this score indicates 
a group performance at the 90-percentile rank. The majority of children (31, 47%) had a score 




ther 25% of the children reached a score within the average range while two children (3%) 
performed below average. These results indicate that the children as a group displayed very 
high general intelligence.  
 
4.2 Transformation and outliers 
 
 Prior to data analysis the dataset was examined for distribution of the variables and 
outliers. Because the distributions for the connectedness and mental state words variables 
were skewed, log transformations were conducted (Stevens, 2009); however, the distributions 
were still skewed and the assumption of normality was violated following transformation (see 
Appendix H). Stevens (2009) posited that regression analysis may be robust to violations of 
normality with a sufficiently large sample size. Additionally, values for the transformed pro-
portional data (i.e., connectedness and mental state words measures for mother and child) 
were negative. Because the assumption of normality was violated and the values of the trans-
formed proportional data were negative, inferences based on the results of the statistical 
analysis need to be drawn with caution.  
 To assess for outliers, standardized scores for the transformed variables were calcu-
lated. Stevens (2009) defined univariate outliers as values greater than ± 3.29 standard devia-
tions from the mean. Univariate outliers were examined and one value was removed from 
each of the following measures: child connectedness at T1, mother connectedness at T1, 
mother mental state talk at T1, and mother mental state talk at T3. Variable names are defined 
in appendix I. Stevens (2009) posited that researchers should consider the cause of the outlier 
(e.g., data entry issues) when considering if outliers should be removed or retained. An addi-
tional consideration is the impact of the outliers on the results of the analysis. To assess the 




outlying values were assessed. The researcher determined that removal of the outliers did not 
have a significant effect on the means and standard deviations (Appendix J). 
 
4.3 Correlation analyses 
 
 Correlational analyses were conducted to examine the relationships between the use of 
mental state words and communication connectedness measures at T1 and T3, social compe-
tence measures at T4, and performance on the false belief task at T4. I opted against Bon-
ferroni adjustments to set a more stringent significance level for multiple comparisons be-
cause of the subsequent loss of power in comparison to using a per test significance threshold 
(Benjamini & Hochberg, 1995). Field (2009) argues that there is always a trade-off and while 
it is important that multiple comparison procedures control the Type I error rate this should be 
the case without a substantial loss in power. Because this was an exploratory study and not a 
confirmatory study I decided against rejecting differences between means that are meaningful 
by taking the increase in the Type I error rate into account. Additionally, many of the methods 
for controlling for family-wise error rates are developed for analysis using normally distrib-
uted variables (Benjamini & Hochberg, 1995). Several variables within the current study are 
not normally distributed.  The results of the analysis are presented in Table 15.  
 Analysis revealed significant correlations between mental state words, communication 
connectedness, performance on the false belief task and the social competence measures 
(SRS-2, SDQ) at T4. Therefore, these variables were included in regression analysis to assess 






Results for the correlations between connectedness, mental state words measures, social competence, false belief task, CDI, and ROWPVT 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 
1. Child Connected T1 -             
2. Child Connected T3 .146 -            
3. Mother Connected T1 .640** -.026 -           
4. Mother Connected T3 .344** -.003 .615** -          
5. Child Mental State Words T1 -.028 -.077 .259 .067 -         
6. Child Mental State Words T3 -.059 .227 .001 -.083 .165 -        
7. Mother Mental State Words T1 -.025 -.189 .002 .130 .339* .041 -       
8. Mother Mental State Words T3 .055 .270* -.015 .038 .144 .253* .154 -      
9. SDQ T4 -.236 -.050 -.423** -.205 -.358** -.011 -.118 -.158 -     
10. SRS-2 T4 -.279* -.089 -.476** -.283* -.343* -.158 -.076 -.258* .828** -    
11. False Belief Task T4 -.123 .085 -.138 -.158 -.035 .262* .033 .170 .036 .013 -   
12. CDI T1 .463** .119 .623** .435** .034 .072 .110 .126 -.391** -.492** -.107 -  
13. ROWPVT T1 .507** .189 .590** .396** .081 -.052 .001 .187 -.335** -.412** -.173 .683** - 
14. ROWPVT T3 .357** .065 .428** .255* -.089 -.038 -.035 .048 -.260* -.343** -.064 .488** .588** 




4.4 Main data analyses 
 
Research Question 1 
Is the maternal or child’s mental state talk or communication connectedness at times 1 and/or 
3 associated with the child’s performance of the false-belief task at time 4? 
 
Time 1. A binary logistic regression analysis was conducted to determine whether child con-
nectedness at T1, mother connectedness at T1, child mental state words  at T1, and mother 
mental state words at T1 had a significant effect on the odds of the child passing the false be-
lief task. The reference category for the false belief task at T4 was 0 (not passing). The overall 
model was not significant, χ2(4) = 3.11, p = .539, suggesting that child connectedness at T1, 
mother connectedness at T1, child mental state words at T1, and mother mental state words at 
T1 were not associated with the odds of passing the false belief task at T4. Since the overall 
model was not significant, the individual predictors were not examined further. Table 16 
summarizes the results of the regression model. 
 
Table 16 
Logistic regression results with performance on false belief task (T4), connectedness (T1), 
and mental state words (T1) 
Variable Exp(B) B SE χ2 p 
Child connectedness at T1 1.15 0.14 2.84 0.30 .961 
Mother connectedness at T1 0.01 -4.79 3.03 5.95 .114 
Child mental state words at T1 1.10 0.10 0.93 0.51 .917 
Mother mental state words at T1 0.82 -0.20 2.75 0.40 .941 
 
 
Time 3. A binary logistic regression was conducted to determine whether mother connected-
ness at T3, child mental state words at T3, mother mental state words at T3, and child con-




task at T4. The reference category for false belief task at T4 was 0.  The overall model was 
not significant, χ2(4) = 5.52, p = .238, suggesting that mother connectedness at T3, child men-
tal state words at T3, mother mental state words at T3, and child connectedness at T3 did not 
have a significant effect on the odds of passing the false belief task at T4. Since the overall 
model was not significant, the individual predictors were not examined further. Table 17 
summarizes the results of the regression model. 
Table 17  
Logistic regression results with connectedness (T3) and mental state words (T3) predicting 
performance on false belief task (T4) 
 
Variable    Exp(B) B SE χ2 p 
Mother connectedness at T3 0.13 -2.05 2.39 3.00 .392 
Child mental state words at T3 9.47 2.25 1.29 6.73 .081 
Mother mental state words at T3 5.49 1.70 2.09 2.85 .415 
Child connectedness at T3 0.83 -0.18 2.68 0.37 .946 
 
 
Research Question 2 
Is the maternal or child’s mental state talk or communication connectedness at times 1 and/or 
3 associated with the child's social competence at time 4? 
 
Association between T1 measurements and Social Responsiveness Scale (Second edition; 
SRS-2) at T4 
 A hierarchical multiple linear regression analysis was conducted to assess whether a 
significant relationship existed between child connectedness at T1, mother connectedness at 
T1, child mental state words at T1, and mother mental state words at T1 and SRS-2 at T4. 
Normally, the order that variables are added to a hierarchical model is determined by the de-
gree to which their influence on the outcome variable has been established in literature. Since 




mental state talk on social outcome the order was based on the previous correlation analysis. 
A stronger correlation was found between communication connectedness measures and scores 
of SRS-2 than between mental state talk measures and scores of SRS-2. Therefore, communi-
cation connectedness was added to the model first. This is also the case in all the following 
hierarchical analysis. The analysis was conducted in two steps or models; model 1 consisted 
of connectedness measures at T1, while model 2 consisted of both connectedness measures 
and mental state talk. The assumption of normality was assessed by plotting the quantiles of 
the model residuals against the quantiles of a Chi-square distribution, also called a Q-Q scat-
terplot. For the assumption of normality to be met, the quantiles of the residuals must not 
strongly deviate from the theoretical quantiles. Strong deviations could indicate that the pa-
rameter estimates are unreliable (Stevens, 2009). The assumption of homoscedasticity was 
assessed by plotting the model residuals against the predicted model values. The assumption 
is met if the points appear randomly distributed with a mean of zero and no apparent curva-
ture (Stevens, 2009). The data satisfied both the assumptions of normality and homoscedastic-
ity. Variance Inflation Factors (VIFs) were calculated to detect the presence of multicollinear-
ity between predictors. High VIFs indicate increased effects of multicollinearity in the model. 
VIFs greater than 6 are cause for concern, whereas a VIFs of 10 should be considered the 
maximum upper limit (Stevens, 2009). All predictors in the regression model have VIFs less 
than 10, thus the assumption was met. Table 18 presents the VIFs for each predictor in the 
model. 
 The hierarchical linear regression analysis was conducted to reveal how much variance 
in SRS-2 scores at T4 was accounted for by connectedness and mental state talk measures at 
Time 1. Maternal and child measures were both included in the model for predicting SRS-2 
scores in order to further explore the question whether children's mental state talk additionally 
might be an indicator of their social competence. Table 18 summarizes the model estimates 




with mental state talk scores (model 2). The analysis indicated that connectedness scores 
alone accounted for 12% of the variance in SRS-2 scores, F(2,49) = 4.50, p = .016. When the 
mental state talk measures were added, they accounted to 5% additional variance. The total 
model accounted for 17% of the variance in SRS-2 scores, F(4,47) = 3.63, p = .012. Because 
the models were significant, the individual predictors were assessed further. The predictors 
were investigated in model 1 since model 2 was not a significant improvement over model 1 
(R² = .12 for Step 1, ∆R² = .05 for Step 2 (p = 1.39)). In model 1, mother connectedness at T1 
was the only statistically significant predictor, B = -37.50, t = -2.63, p = .022. This result indi-
cates that for every one unit increase in the number of maternal utterances which were con-
nected to their child's previous remark there was a 37.50 unit decrease in SRS-2 score. Even 
though the second model was not a significant improvement, it is noteworthy that child men-
tal state talk approached significance (B = -10.36, t = -1.90, p = .063), however, it did not 
meet the .05 alpha level for the analysis.  
 
Table 18   
Results of the hierarchical multiple linear regression with connectedness (T1) and mental state 
words (T1) predicting SRS-2 (T4) 
  VIF B SE β t p R² ∆R²  
Model 1 Child Connected T1 1.10 -17.01 15.97 -0.15 -1.07 .292 .12 .12 
 Mother Connected T1 1.10 -37.50 15.87 -0.33 -2.36 .022  
Model 2 Child Connected T1 1.13 -20.90 15.75 -0.18 -1.33 .191 .17 .05 
 Mother Connected T1 1.26 -25.15 16.52 -0.22 -1.52 .135  
 Child Mental State Talk T1 1.20 -10.36 5.45 -0.27 -1.90 .063  
 Mother Mental State Talk T1 1.22 -7.79 13.96 -0.08 -0.56 .579  






Association between T1 measurements and the Strength and Difficulties Questionnaires 
(SDQ) scores at T4 
 A hierarchical multiple linear regression analysis was conducted to assess whether a 
significant relationship existed between child connectedness at T1, mother connectedness at 
T1, child mental state words at T1, and mother mental state words at T1 and SDQ at T4. For 
the hierarchical analysis, connectedness measures for child and mother at T1 were entered in 
model 1. The mental state talk measures for child and mother at T1 were entered in model 2. 
The assumption of normality was assessed by a Q-Q scatterplot and was met. The assumption 
of homoscedasticity was assessed by plotting the model residuals against the predicted model 
values and was met. No multicollinearity was detected as all predictors in the regression 
model have VIFs less than 10. Table 19 presents the VIFs for each predictor in the model. 
 The hierarchical linear regression analysis was conducted to reveal how much variance 
in SDQ scores was accounted for by connectedness and mental state talk measures. Table 19 
summarizes the model estimates for the analysis with connectedness scores by themselves 
(model 1) and connectedness scores with mental state talk scores (model 2). The analyses 
indicated that connectedness scores accounted for 21% of the variance in SDQ scores without 
including mental state talk measures, F(2,50) = 7.82, p = .001. Upon addition of the mental 
state talk measures, the model accounted for 26% of the variance in SDQ scores when mental 
state talk measures were included, F(4,48) = 5.58, p = .001.  Because the models were signifi-
cant, the individual predictors were assessed further. The predictors were investigated in 
model 1 since model 2 was not a significant improvement over model 1 (R² = .12 for Step 
1, ∆R² = .05 for Step 2 (p = 1.39)). In model 1 mother connectedness at T1 was a statistically 
significant predictor, B = -14.41, t = -3.09, p = .003. This result indicates that for every one 
unit increase in the number of maternal utterances which were connected to their child's pre-




child mental state talk approached significance (B = -3.11, t = -2.00, p = .052), however, it did 
not meet the .05 alpha level for the analysis.  
 
Table 19 
Results of hierarchical multiple linear regression with connectedness (T1) and mental state words 
(T1) predicting SDQ (T4) 
  VIF B SE β t p R² ∆R² 
Model 1 Child Connected T1 1.09  -6.87 4.67 -.190 -1.47 .148 .21 .21
 Mother Connected T1 1.09 -14.41 4.67 -.398 -3.09 .003 
Model 2 Child Connected T1 1.12 -7.75 4.57 -.214 -1.70 .096 .26 .05
 Mother Connected T1 1.24 -10.77 4.82 -.297 -2.24 .030 
 Child Mental State Words T1 1.19 -3.11 1.56 -.259 -2.00 .052 
 Mother Mental State Words T1 1.22 -2.56 4.10 -.082 -0.62 .536 
Note. Model 1: F(2, 52) = 7.82, p = .001, R2 = .21. Model 2: F(4, 48) = 5.58, p = .001, R2 = .26. 
 
Association between T3 measurements and SRS-2 scores at T4 
 A hierarchical multiple linear regression analysis was conducted to assess whether a 
significant relationship existed between mother connectedness at T3, child mental state words 
at T3, mother mental state words at T3, and child connectedness at T3and SRS-2 at T4. The 
assumption of normality was assessed through a Q-Q scatterplot and was met. The assump-
tion of homoscedasticity was assessed through a scatterplot and was met. All predictors in the 
regression model have VIFs less than 10, thus no multicollinearity was found. Table 20 pre-
sents the VIFs for each predictor in the model. 
 The hierarchical linear regression analysis was conducted to reveal how much variance 
in SRS-2 scores was accounted for by connectedness and mental state talk measures at T3. 
Table 20 summarizes the model estimates for the analysis with connectedness scores at T3 by 
themselves (model 1) and connectedness scores with mental state talk scores at T3 (model 2). 
The analyses indicated that connectedness scores accounted for 7% of the variance in SRS-2 
scores without including mental state talk measures, F(2,62) = 3.47, p = .037. Upon addition 




scores when mental state talk measures were included, F(4,60) = 3.10, p = .022. Because the 
models were significant, the individual predictors were assessed further. The predictors were 
investigated in model 1 since model 2 was not a significant improvement over model 1 (R² = 
.12 for Step 1, ∆R² = .05 for Step 2 (p = 1.68)). In model 1, mother connectedness at T3 was a 
statistically significant predictor, B = -41.00, t = -2.53, p = .014. This result indicates that for 
every one unit increase in the number of maternal utterances which were connected to their 
child's previous remark there was a 41.00 unit decrease in SRS-2 score. 
 
Table 20   
Results of the hierarchical multiple linear regression for predicting SRS-2 (T4) from connected-
ness (T3), and mental state words (T3) 
 
  VIF B SE β t p R² ∆R² 
Model 1 Child Connected T3 1.00 -11.10 17.84 -0.08 -0.62 .536 .07 .07
 Mother Connected T3 1.00 -41.00 16.21 -0.31 -2.53 .014
Model 2 Child Connected T3 1.12 2.07 18.37 0.01 0.11 .911 .12 .05
 Mother Connected T3 1.02 -41.95 15.93 -0.31 -2.63 .011
 Child Mental State Talk T3 1.12 -9.06 8.49 -0.13 -1.07 .290
 Mother Mental State Talk T3 1.14 -19.61 11.48 -0.21 -1.71 .093
Note. Model 1: F(2, 62) = 3.47, p = .037, R2 = .07. Model 2: F(4, 60) = 3.10, p = .022, R2 = .12. 
 
Association between T3 measurements and SDQ scores at T4 
 A hierarchical multiple linear regression analysis was conducted to assess whether a 
significant relationship existed between mother connectedness at T3, child mental state words 
at T3, mother mental state words at T3, and child connectedness at T3 and SDQ at T4. Model 
1 of the regression analysis consisted of the connectedness measures at T3. Model 2 of the 
regression analysis consisted of the connectedness measures and mental state talk measures at 
T3. The assumption of homoscedasticity was assessed through a scatterplot and was met. All 
predictors in the regression model have VIFs less than 10; as such, no multicollinearity is pre-




 The results of the hierarchical multiple linear regression for model 1 were not signifi-
cant, F(2,63) = 2.00, p = .144, R2 = 0.03, indicating mother connectedness and child connect-
edness at T3 did not explain a significant proportion of variation in SDQ at T4. Results of the 
hierarchical multiple linear regression for model 2 were not significant, F(4,61) = 1.35, p = 
.261, R2 = 0.02, indicating that connectedness and mental state talk measures at T3 did not 
explain a significant proportion of variation in SDQ at T4. Since the overall model was not 
significant, the individual predictors were not examined further. Table 21 summarizes the 
results of the regression model. 
 
 Table 21 
Results for hierarchical multiple linear regression for predicting SDQ (T4) from connectedness 
(T3), and mental state words (T3) 
  VIF B SE β t p R² ∆R² 
Model 1 Child Connected T3 1.00 -1.56 5.57 -0.03 -0.28 .781 .03 .03
 Mother Connected T3 1.00 -9.92 5.05 -0.24 -1.97 .054
Model 2 Child Connected T3 1.12 .292 5.90 0.01 0.05 .961 .02 -.01
 Mother Connected T3 1.01 -9.75 5.10 -0.24 -1.91 .060
 Child Mental State Talk T3 1.11 0.15 2.71 0.01 0.05 .957
 Mother Mental State Talk T3 1.13 -4.35 3.66 -0.16 -1.19 .239
 Note. Model 1: F(2,63) = 2.00, p = .144, R2 = 0.03. Model 2: F(4,61) = 1.35, p = .261, R2 = 0.02. 
 
Research Question 3 
Is performance of the false-belief task at time 4 associated with the child's social competence 
at time 4? 
 
 To assess the relationship between performance on the false belief task at T4 and 
child’s social competence, Spearman correlation analyses were conducted. Results indicated 
that there were no statistically significant relationships between the false belief task and SDQ 





4.5 Summary of main data analyses 
 
 Mother communication connectedness was found to be a significant predictor of 
scores of both questionnaires. Mother connectedness for T1 and T3 predicted how mothers 
scored their children's social competence on the SRS-2 at T4. For the SDQ it was only mother 
communication connectedness at T1 which significantly predicted children's scores on this 
questionnaire at T4. These results will be further discussed in the following chapter.  
  
4.6 Secondary analyses 
 
 The main question in this thesis was whether specific aspects of language are linked to 
social competence through perspective taking and awareness of others' false belief. Mental 
state talk and communication connectedness have been identified to be related to false-belief 
understanding in children. Therefore, in order to answer my main question these two aspects 
of language were considered. Mother communication connectedness was found to be a sig-
nificant predictor of scores of questionnaires assessing the children's social competence. This 
indicated that there is relation between specific aspects of language and social competence. 
Nevertheless, the amount of variance explained by communication connectedness and mental 
state talk was modest and therefore other variables must have been involved in the children's 
social development. In order to explore the relationship between specific aspects of language 
and social competence in more depth further analyses were considered.  
 Children with poor receptive or expressive language are at higher risk of displaying 
behaviour problems than their typically developing peers (e.g., Bretherton et al., 2013; 
Horwitz et al., 2003; Irwin, Carter, & Briggs-Gowan, 2002). Therefore, it is likely that these 




Indeed, correlation analysis of the current study, identified significant correlations between 
the CDI at T1 which assessed expressive vocabulary, the ROWPVT at T1 and T3 which as-
sessed receptive vocabulary and the scores for both parental questionnaires (SDQ and SRS-2) 
at T4 indicating a relationship between the children's expressive and receptive vocabulary at 
T1 and T3 and their social competence at T4. Therefore, in addition to the stated research 
question it was of interest to determine whether expressive and receptive vocabulary meas-
ured with the CDI and the ROWPVT accounted for further variance in social competence.  
 
Association between T1 additional measurements and SRS-2 scores at T4 
 As reported, it was found that children with language impairment often displayed dif-
ficulties in their social competence. This indicates a relationship between language abilities 
and social competence. Therefore, the previous regression analysis was repeated by adding 
CDI and ROWPVT scores in the model first in order to control for expressive and receptive 
vocabulary. A hierarchical multiple linear regression analysis was conducted to assess 
whether a significant relationship existed between CDI at T1, ROWPVT at T1, child connect-
edness at T1, mother connectedness at T1, child mental state words at T1, mother mental state 
words at T1 and SRS-2 at T4. Model 1 of the analysis comprised CDI and ROWPVT scores 
at T1. Model 2 of the analysis comprised CDI and ROWPVT scores and connectedness at T1. 
Model 3 of the analysis comprised CDI, ROWPVT, connectedness and mental state talk at 
T1. The assumption of normality was assessed by a Q-Q scatterplot and was met. The as-
sumption of homoscedasticity was assessed by plotting the model residuals against the pre-
dicted model values and was met. All predictors in the regression model have VIFs less than 
10, so the assumption of absence of multicollinearity was met. Table 22 presents the VIFs for 
each predictor in the model. 
 The results of the hierarchical linear regression model were significant in model 1, 




SRS-2 was accounted for by CDI and ROWPVT scores at T1. In model 2, F(4,47) = 4.04, p = 
.007, R2 = 0.26, indicating that approximately 26% of the variance in SRS-2 was explainable 
by CDI, ROWPVT and connectedness at T1. The results were also significant in model 3, 
F(6,45) = 4.18, p = .002, R2 = 0.36, indicating that approximately 36% of the variance in 
SRS-2 was accounted for by the model. Because the models were significant, the individual 
predictors were assessed further. Model 3 was a significant improvement over model 1 and 
model 2 and was therefore used for the examination of individual predictors (R² = .26 for Step 
2, ∆R² = .36 for Step 3 (p = .04)). Results of the regression are included in Table 22. CDI at 
T1 was a statistically significant predictor, B = -0.04, t = -2.67, p = .011. This result indicates 
that for every one unit increase in child expressive vocabulary, there was a 0.04 unit decrease 
in SRS-2. Child's mental state talk at T1 was also a statistically significant predictor, B = -
11.68, t = -2.28, p = .028. 
 
Table 22  
Results for hierarchical multiple linear regression for predicting SRS-2 (T4) from CDI (T1), 
ROWVPT (T1), connectedness (T1) and mental state words (T1)  
  VIF B SE β t p R² ∆R² 
Model 1 CDI scores T1 1.60 -0.04 0.01 -0.45 -2.82 .007 .22 .22 
 ROWPVT Score T1 1.60 -0.05 0.22 -0.04 -0.22 .825  
Model 2 CDI scores T1 1.64 -0.04 0.01 -0.40 -2.37 .022 .26 .04 
 ROWPVT Score T1 1.62 -0.07 0.23 0.54 0.32 .754  
 Child Connected T1 1.14 -15.24 15.74 -0.13 -0.97 .338  
 Mother Connected T1 1.15 -16.73 18.19 -0.15 -0.92 .363  
Model 3 CDI scores T1 1.80 -0.04 0.01 -0.43 -2.67 .011 .36 .10 
 ROWPVT Score T1 1.93 0.03 0.23 0.02 0.14 .886  
 Child Connected T1 1.20 -18.67 15.23 -0.16 -1.23 .227  
 Mother Connected T1 1.84 0.70 18.72 0.06 0.04 .970  
 Child Mental State Talk T1 1.21 -11.68 5.13 -0.30 -2.28 .028  
 Mother Mental State Talk T1 1.28 -9.21 13.38 -0.09 -0.69 .495  
Note. Model 1: F(2,49) = 7.02, p = .002, R2 = 0.22. Model 2: F(4,47) = 4.04, p = .007, R2 = 0.26. 







Association between T1 additional measurements and SDQ scores at T4 
 A hierarchical multiple linear regression analysis was conducted to assess whether a 
significant relationship existed between CDI at T1, ROWPVT at T1, child connectedness at 
T1, mother connectedness at T1, child mental state words at T1, mother mental state words at 
T1 and SDQ at T4. The predictor variables were entered hierarchically, with model 1 consist-
ing of CDI and ROWPVT scores. Model 2 consisted of CDI, ROWPVT and connectedness 
measures. Model 3 consisted of CDI, ROWPVT, connectedness and mental state talk meas-
ures. The assumption of normality was examined through a Q-Q scatterplot and was met. 
Strong deviations could indicate that the parameter estimates are unreliable. The assumption 
of homoscedasticity was assessed by plotting the model residuals against the predicted model 
values and was met. The assumption of absence of multicollinearity was met, as all predictors 
in the regression model have VIFs less than 10. Table 23 presents the VIFs for each predictor 
in the model. 
 The results of the hierarchical linear regression model were significant in model 1, 
F(2,50) = 5.23, p = .009, R2 = 0.17, indicating that approximately 17% of the variance in SDQ 
was explainable by CDI and ROWPVT scores at T1. In model 2, F(4,48) = 4.50, p = .004, R2 
= 0.27, indicating that approximately 27% of the variance in SDQ was explainable by CDI, 
ROWPVT and connectedness measures at T1. The results were also significant in model 3, 
F(6,46) = 4.43, p = .001, R² = 0.37, indicating that approximately 37% of the variance in SDQ 
was accounted for by the model.  
 Results of the regression are included in Table 23. Model 3 was a significant im-
provement over model 1 and model 2 and was therefore used for the examination of individ-
ual predictors (R² = .27 for Step 2, ∆R² = .37 for Step 3 (p = .04)). In model 3, child mental 
state talk was a statistically significant predictor, B = -3.44, t = -2.22, p = .031. This results 




crease in SDQ scores. Mother connectedness approached significance (B = -10.70, t = -1.92, p 
= .061), however, it did not meet the .05 alpha level for the analysis. 
 
Table 23  
Results for hierarchical multiple linear regression for predicting SDQ (T4) from CDI (T1), 
ROWPVT (T1), connectedness (T1) and mental state words (T1) 
  VIF B SE β t p R² ∆R² 
Model 1 CDI Score T1 1.57 -0.01 0.00 -0.34 -2.10 .041 .17 .17
 ROWPVT Score T1 1.57 -0.05 0.07 -0.11 -0.71 .481
Model 2 CDI Score T1 1.60 -0.01 0.00 -0.26 -1.44 .156 .27 .10
 ROWPVT Score T1 1.59 -0.02 0.07 -0.04 0.26 .798
 Child Connected T1 1.14 -6.74 4.81 -0.19 -1.40 .168
 Mother Connected T1 1.16 -10.70 5.58 -0.30 -1.92 .061
Model 3 CDI Score T1 1.79 -0.01 0.00 -0.28 -1.76 .085 . 37 .10
 ROWPVT Score T1 1.90 0.01 0.07 0.03 0.17 .869
 Child Connected T1 1.20 -7.51 4.66 -0.21 -1.61 .114
 Mother Connected T1 1.83 -5.68 5.74 -0.16 -0.99 .328
 Child Mental State Talk T1 1.21 -3.44 1.55 -0.29 -2.22 .031
 Mother Mental State Talk T1 1.28 -2.75 4.13 -0.09 -0.67 .509
Note. Model 1: F(2,50) = 5.23, p = .009, R2 = 0.17. Model 2: F(4,48) = 4.50, p = .004, R2 = 0.27. 
Model 3: F(6,46) = 4.43, p = .001, R² = 0.37. 
 
Association between T3 additional measurements and SRS-2 scores at T4 
 A hierarchical multiple linear regression analysis was conducted to assess whether a 
significant relationship existed between ROWPVT at T3, child connectedness at T3, mother 
connectedness at T3, child mental state words at T3, mother mental state words at T3 and 
SRS-2 at T4. Model 1 of the analysis consisted of ROWPVT scores. Model 2 of the analysis 
consisted of ROWPVT, and connectedness measures. Model 3 of the analysis consisted of 
ROWPVT, connectedness and mental state talk measures. The assumption of normality was 
assessed by plotting a Q-Q scatterplot and was met. The assumption of homoscedasticity was 
assessed by plotting the model residuals against the predicted model values and was met. All 
predictors in the regression model have VIFs less than 10, which indicates absence of multi-




 Results of the regression are included in Table 24. The results of the hierarchical linear 
regression for model 1 were significant, F(1,63) = 8.62, p = .005, R² = 0.12, indicating that 
approximately 12% of the variance in SRS-2 at T4 is explainable by ROWPVT scores at T3. 
The results show that model 2 was significant, F(3,61) = 4.48, p = .007, R2 = 0.18, indicating 
that approximately 18% of the variance in SRS-2 at T4 is explainable by ROWPVT scores 
and connectedness measures. Model 3 was also significant, F(5,59) = 3.96, p = .004, R² = 
0.25, indicating that approximately 25% of the variance in SRS-2 at T4 is explainable by 
ROWPVT scores, connectedness and mental state talk measures at T3. The predictors were 
investigated in model 1 since model 2 and model 3 were not a significant improvement over 
model 1 (R² = .12 for Step 1, ∆R² = .06 for Step 2 (p = .12), ∆R² = .07 for Step 3 (p = .07)). In 
model 1, ROWPVT scores at T3 was a statistically significant predictor, B = -0.44, t = -2.94, 
p = .01. This result indicates that for every one unit increase in the number of maternal utter-




Results for hierarchical multiple linear regression for predicting SRS-2 (T4) from ROWPVT (T3), 
connectedness (T3) and mental state words (T3) 
  VIF B SE β t p R² ∆R² 
Model 1 ROWPVT T3 1.00 -0.44 0.15 -0.35 -2.94 .005 .12 .12
Model 2 ROWPVT T3 1.01 -0.44 0.15 -0.34 -2.93 .005 .18 .06
 Child Connected T3 1.08 -7.62 17.23 -0.05 -0.44 .660
 Mother Connected T3 1.08 -18.56 10.99 -0.20 -1.69 .044
Model 3 ROWPVT T3 1.06 -0.37 0.15 -0.29 -2.51 .015 .25 .07
 Child Connected T3 1.12 5.62 17.67 0.04 0.32 .752
 Mother Connected T3 1.06 -34.08 15.59 -0.25 -2.19 .033
 Child Mental State Talk T3 1.13 -10.46 8.15 -0.15 -1.28 .205
 Mother Mental State Talk T3 1.14 -18.11 11.02 -0.20 -1.64 .106
Note. Model 1: F(1,63) = 8.62, p = .005, R² = 0.12. Model 2: F(3,61) = 4.48, p = .007, R2 = 0.18. 






Association between T3 additional measurements and SDQ scores at T4 
 A hierarchical multiple linear regression analysis was conducted to assess whether a 
significant relationship existed between ROWPVT at T3, child connectedness at T3, mother 
connectedness at T3, child mental state words at T3, mother mental state words at T3 and 
SDQ at T4. Model 1 of the analysis consisted of ROWPVT scores. Model 2 of the analysis 
consisted of ROWPVT and connectedness measures. Model 3 of the analysis consisted of 
ROWPVT, connectedness and mental state talk measures The assumption of normality was 
assessed by plotting a Q-Q scatterplot and was met. The assumption of homoscedasticity was 
assessed by plotting the model residuals against the predicted model values and was met. All 
predictors in the regression model have VIFs less than 10, which indicates absence of multi-
collinearity. Table 25 presents the VIFs for each predictor in the model. 
 The results of the hierarchical linear regression for model 1 were significant, F(1,64) = 
4.99, p = .03, R2 = 0.07, indicating that approximately 7% of the variance in SDQ at T4 is 
explainable by ROWPVT scores at T3. The results indicate that model 2 was not significant, 
F(3,62) = 2.49, p = .07, R2 = 0.11, indicating that approximately 11% of the variance in SDQ 
at T4 is explainable by ROWPVT, child connectedness at T3 and mother connectedness at 
T3. Results of model 3 were also not significant, F(5,60) = 1.76, p = .13, R2 = 0.13, indicating 
that approximately 13% of the variance in SDQ at T4 is explainable by ROWPVT, connect-
edness and mental state words measures at T3. The predictors were investigated in model 1 
since model 2 and model 3 were not a significant improvement over model 1 (R² = .07 for 
Step 1, ∆R² = .04 for Step 2 (p = 0.30), ∆R² = .13 for Step 3 (p = 0.50)). In model 1, 
ROWPVT scores significantly predicted SRS-2 at T4, B = -0.27, t = -2.23, p =.03. This result 
indicates that for every one unit increase in the number of the child's receptive vocabulary 
there was a 0.27 unit decrease in SDQ at T4. Results of the multiple linear regression are in-






Results for hierarchical multiple linear regression for predicting SDQ (T4) from ROWPVT (T3),  
connectedness (T3) and mental state words (T3) 
  VIF B SE β t p R² ∆R² 
Model 1 ROWPVT T3 1.00 -0.10 0.05 -0.27 -2.23 .03 .07 .07
Model 2 ROWPVT T3 1.00 -0.09 0.05 -0.23 -1.82 .07 .11 .04
 Child Connected T3 1.07 -0.82 5.48 0.02 -0.15 .88 
 Mother Connected T3 1.07 -7.88 5.08 -0.19 -1.55 .13 
Model 3 ROWPVT T3 1.06 -0.09 0.05 -0.22 -1.79 .08 .13 .03
 Child Connected T3 1.12 1.04 5.81 0.02 0.18 .86 
 Mother Connected T3 1.06 -7.78 5.13 -0.19 -1.52 .13 
 Child Mental State Talk T3 1.11 -0.06 2.66 0.00 -0.02 .98 
 Mother Mental State Talk T3 1.13 -4.16 3.59 -0.15 -1.16 .25 
Note. Model 1: F(1,64) = 4.99, p = .03, R2 = 0.07. Model 2: F(3,62) = 2.49, p = .07, R2 = 0.11. Model 3: 
F(5,60) = 1.76, p = .13, R2 = 0.13 
 
4.7 Summary of secondary analyses 
 
 Secondary analysis were conducted in order to find out whether receptive and expres-
sive language skills accounted for further variance in social competence scores. By adding the 
CDI but not the ROWPVT scores to the model first, a much stronger model for the prediction 
of SRS-2 was created. CDI at the age of 24 to 31 months was a significant predictor of the 
social outcome of children at the age of 5 years measured with the SRS-2. This seems to indi-
cate that expressive vocabulary has a strong link to social outcome. Additionally, child mental 
state talk at the age of 24 to 31 months was a significant predictor for scores of both meas-
urements of social competence at the age of 5 years - SDQ and SRS-2. Surprisingly, mother 
connectedness was no longer a significant predictor of social outcome. These results will be 






 In this chapter, the results are discussed, and the current study is placed within the lar-
ger research framework. First, an overview of the study is provided to provide the aim of the 
current study and how it is addressed. Furthermore, the current study’s results are discussed in 
detail and in relation to the existing literature, followed by an assessment of the strengths and 
weaknesses of the current study, implications for clinical practice and suggestions for future 
research. Finally, the chapter ends with conclusions on how the current study’s aim has been 
fulfilled.  
 
5.1 Overview of the study   
  
 The main aim of the current study is to assess the relationship between language and 
children's social competence. The overarching hypothesis is that children's ability to produce 
and hear mental state words and be connected in communication with their mothers at time 1 
(T1) and time 3 (T3) is linked to the children's social competence at time 4 (T4) through the 
social skill of perspective taking and the ability to understand that other people might hold a 
false belief. Three research questions have been asked to explore this hypothesis. In the first 
research question, it was examined whether mental state talk and communication connected-
ness measured at children's age of 24–31 months and at 41–49 months improved predictive 
models for false-belief understanding at 5 years of age in this cohort. In the second research 
question, we explored whether the aspects of mental state talk and communication connected-
ness predicted social competence of five-year olds. The third research question addressed the 
relationship between children's false-belief understanding and their social competence at the 




dence of the influence between expressive language, including mental state words and mater-
nal communication connectedness, and social competence in children who are in the age 
range of 2–5 years, while acknowledging that no firm conclusion could be drawn about the 
role of false-belief understanding on social competence in the current study. A discussion of 
the results is presented in the following section. 
 
5.2 The predictive relationship between mental state talk, communication connectedness 
and children's later false-belief understanding 
  
 In the current study, mental state talk and communication connectedness were not as-
sociated with children's performance of the false-belief task later in their development (T1: 
χ2(4) = 3.11, p = .539; T3: χ2(4) = 5.52, p = .238). These findings contradict the results of pre-
vious studies, which reported that talk about mental states, including emotions, desires, 
thoughts and knowledge, is related to the development of false-belief understanding (Adrian 
et al., 2005; Ensor et al., 2014; Howard, Mayeux, & Naigles, 2008; Hughes & Dunn, 1997; 
Symons et al., 2006; Turnbull et al., 2008). 
 There are several possible explanations for these unexpected findings. First, it is feasi-
ble that the task chosen to assess false-belief understanding in the current study was not ap-
propriate enough for various reasons. The nonverbal, competitive task used in the present 
study was designed by Krachun et al. (2009). The rationale to assess children on this specific 
task was based on the consideration that it was a valid measure of one’s ability to take another 
person's perspective and understand that the other person might be holding a false belief. Kra-
chun et al. (2009) reported that in their study, 70% (14) of the five-year-old typically develop-
ing children passed this nonverbal and competitive task with the passing criterion at three or 




the Sally-Anne test, which is a standard verbal change-of-location task often used to assess 
false-belief understanding in children. This indicated that the nonverbal, competitive false-
belief task was a valid assessment. Additionally, this task was chosen because children did not 
require specific linguistic skills to pass, and they were observing and acting out instead of 
answering questions. This was of great importance since language was one of the predictor 
variables. Finally, Krachun et al. (2009) assessed this task on a group of 20 typically develop-
ing children aged between 54 to 61 months old (mean = 58 months). The mean age of our 
group of children was 63.3 months, so there was a very close match between the children in 
the current study and the children assessed by Krachun et al. (2009), with our children being a 
bit older. It might be reasonable to think that older children would pass the task more easily 
because they are further developed in false-belief understanding. Nonetheless, in the present 
study, more than half of the children (55%, 37) failed this competitive, nonverbal false-belief 
task. It could be that children did not pass this task because they had not developed an under-
standing of false belief at that time or this task did not appropriately assess false belief under-
standing in the children who participate in the present study. So far, this task has not been 
replicated in another study; therefore, no information about performance across different par-
ticipants has been found. Additionally, there is also a possibility that children did not pass this 
task for other reasons. It is plausible that some of the children were distracted by the competi-
tive context. This context might have made it difficult for children to make careful choices 
because they wanted to act quickly and effectively to win the sticker a competitor missed. 
Children were often very excited about their prospect of winning a sticker; thus, making 
thoughtful responses was rather difficult. In a similar task by Peterson, Slaughter, Peterson 
and Premack (2013), children did well in a competitive setting when they first had to choose 
an adult before the actual act of winning a prize. In this task, 33 (66%) of four-year-old, typi-
cally developing children passed two trials following the given procedures. A child and the 




the room while Midge witnessed how the experimenter was putting the prize in another box. 
Midge also left the room, and once both were back, the child was asked to choose an adult 
(Dot or Midge) to open a box. Children were aware of the fact that if the adult found the prize, 
they would go empty-handed. To receive the prize, children had to understand that Dot was 
holding a false belief and was consequently less likely to open the correct box and that choos-
ing her would increase their own chance of winning. In the current study, children had to first 
reconsider the scene they had observed and think about who had or had not witnessed the 
change instead of immediately acting out by themselves. It might be the case that taking a 
moment to choose an adult is less disruptive to understanding the resulting belief state of oth-
ers than immediately acting out by themselves. Thus, even though the competitive nature of 
the false-belief task used in the current study was intended to make the test easier and more 
interesting for the children, it may have hindered their performance.  
 The second possibility for this contradiction between our findings and those of previ-
ous research could lie in the fact that only one false-belief task was administered in the cur-
rent study, while several false-belief tasks were assessed in the cited studies. The rationale for 
using only one task was that combination of false-belief tasks is quite time-consuming and 
since the current study was part of a broader study, time was limited. It was also important to 
consider that task batteries can include measures that assess other aspects that do not address a 
specific research question, and several standard and non-standard measures are relevant for 
different developmental stages. Therefore, for the current study, only one task was selected. 
This was not the case in the cited studies in which the relationship between maternal mental 
state talk and children's false-belief understanding was found. For example, Ensor et al. 
(2014) assessed 105 children (mean age = 5.93 years) on five false-belief tasks. When the 
children were younger (mean age = 2.36 years), interactions with their mothers were filmed at 
their homes during a meal preparation or while they were having dinner together. Mother's 




frequencies of mothers' cognitive references during interactions with their 2-year-olds pre-
dicted individual differences in children's performance of these five-false belief tasks. Howard 
et al. (2008) tested false-belief understanding in 63 three- and four-year-old children on an 
unexpected content task and on a change of location task. Furthermore, mothers' references to 
mental states in naturalistic interaction with their children were coded and analysed. It was 
found that maternal mental references predicted children's false-belief performance. Symons 
et al. (2006) even used 11 tasks to assess false-belief understanding in 43 children (mean age= 
69.2 months). The same children were observed in a spontaneous play setting with their 
mothers earlier in development (mean age = 24.7 months). The mother's mental state lan-
guage was coded and was found to be significantly related to their children's later understand-
ing of false belief. According to these studies, it could be the case that assessing several false-
belief tasks might provide a more robust collective than a single task measure to assess a rela-
tionship between maternal mental state talk and children's false-belief understanding. Fur-
thermore, it was reported that children can perform inconsistently across different false-belief 
tasks, even across standard tests (Charman & Campbell, 1997). Such discrepancies in per-
formance are likely due to individual differences in false-belief understanding across various 
task types. It is thus possible that the children in the current study were not able to pass the 
false-belief task in the change-of-location paradigm but were able to pass a false-belief task in 
other paradigms, such as change of content. Therefore, for future studies in which associa-
tions between language and false-belief understanding are examined, one recommendation 
would be to focus on a careful selection of tasks for assessing children's false-belief under-
standing. This selection should include tasks that have been used on large representative sam-
ples, have been examined for reliability and are suitable for young children at the same devel-
opment stage.  
 The third possible reason for a contradiction may be found in the manner in which 




(2006) assessed mother–child interactions in a spontaneous setting, whereas other studies 
used specific picture books to observe mother's references to mental states. For example, 
Adrian et al. (2005) assessed mothers' references to mental states while the mothers were 
reading a book with their children. Thirty-four children with a mean age of 4;10 years partici-
pated with their mothers. Those children were also assessed on a false-belief task and the au-
thors reported that the frequency of cognitive and emotional terms correlated positively with 
the children's false-belief understanding. Turnbull et al. (2008) found an association between 
the frequency of mothers' mental state references and their children's false-belief understand-
ing using a picture-book task. In this study, 70 children with a mean age of 53 months partici-
pated with their mothers. The stories in the books used in both studies had a presentation of 
events with obvious mentalist content such as false belief, trickery, and lies in common. It is 
likely that these contrasting settings differentially encouraged participation in social interac-
tion (De Rosnay & Hughes, 2006) and influenced the type of discourse. For example,  Hoff-
Ginsberg (1991) found that maternal vocabulary was richer during book reading than toy 
playing. Thus, these picture books could have encouraged the extent to which mothers re-
ferred to mental states.  
 The findings also contradict the results of two studies that reported that the frequency 
of connected communication between mothers and their children is associated with false-
belief understanding (Dunn & Cutting, 1999; Ensor & Hughes, 2008). Ensor and Hughes 
(2008) examined communication between mothers and their children in a spontaneous play 
setting. Participants were 120 mother–child pairs who took part in a longitudinal study across 
three time points. During the first assessment, children's mean age was 2.38 years; during the 
second, 3.45 years; and during the last, 4.19 years. In the first setting, maternal communica-
tion connectedness was assessed and analysed. Children's false-belief understanding was 
tested at all three time points through several false-belief tasks. A significant correlation be-




all time points (p < .01). It could be that the same methodological issues in the previous sec-
tion might be responsible for these contradicting findings. It seems reasonable that assessing 
several false-belie tasks might provide a more robust outcome than a single task measure in 
detecting a relationship between communication connectedness and children's false-belief 
understanding. 
 Dunn and Cutting (1999) observed 128 children (mean age = 4.16 years) while they 
were playing with friends in a spontaneous play setting. The children were further assessed on 
seven false-belief tasks, and it was found that children who were less connected in communi-
cation with their friends were the ones who scored lower on false-belief tasks. This study dif-
fered in two main aspects from the current study. First, in the current study mother–child 
communication were assessed, whereas Dunn and Cutting (1999) measured communication 
between friends. Second, Dunn and Cutting (1999) used far more tasks to assess false-belief 
understanding. Moreover, the number of tasks used to assess false belief could be important, 
but it is also probable that communication between friends is structured differently from that 
between a mother and her child. Siblings and friends are also reported to have an impact on a 
child's development. Children with more siblings have been found to pass tasks that assess 
earlier false-belief understanding (McAlister & Peterson, 2007; Perner, Ruffman, & Leekam, 
1994; Ruffman, Perner, Naito, Parkin, & Clements, 1998). Furthermore, findings from the 
Pennsylvania Study of Social Understanding (Dunn, 1999) indicated that children spontane-
ously referred more often to mental states when they talked to their siblings rather than their 
mothers.  
 In summary, in contrast to previous research, it was not found that mental state talk 
and communication connectedness were related to false-belief understanding. It is likely that 





5.3 The predictive relationship between mental state talk, communication connectedness 
and children's later social competence that was measured through the SRS-2 
  
 As reported in the literature review, previous research found that a high frequency of 
mental state talk and communication connectedness had an impact on children's false-belief 
understanding (Adrian et al., 2005; Cutting & Dunn, 1999; Ensor et al., 2014; Ensor & 
Hughes, 2008; Howard et al., 2008; Hughes & Dunn, 1997; Symons et al., 2006; Turnbull et 
al., 2008). Moreover, it was reported that false-belief understanding was linked to social com-
petence (De Rosnay et al., 2013; Slaughter et al., 2002). De Rosnay et al. (2013) reported that 
children who performed well in false-belief tasks also displayed high social skills in everyday 
conversations that require taking others’ perspective into account. Since all these factors seem 
to be indirectly related with each other, the rationale for including a regression analysis to 
assess a relationship among mental state talk, communication connectedness and social com-
petence was based on the hypothesis that the described language measurements might also be 
directly related to social competence. Additionally, analysis revealed a significant correlation 
between the SRS-2 questionnaire and children’s mental state talk (r = −0.34), the mother’s 
mental state talk (r = −0.26), the child's connectedness (r = −0.28) and the mother’s connect-
edness (r = −0.28).   
 In the present study, communication connectedness and mental state talk at the age of 
24–31 months (T1) accounted for 17% of the variance in social competence that was assessed 
through the SRS-2 at the age of 5 years. At the age of 42–48 months (T3), the model ac-
counted for 12% of the variance. Specifically, the manner in which the mothers' talk was con-
nected to their children's talk contributed to predicting the children's SRS-2 scores. We should 
note that the amount of variance explained by communication connectedness is modest, as it 
indicates that other factors might be involved, such as language and other aspects of children's 




(1991)). The relationship between maternal connectedness and children's social competence 
seemed to be stable, with the mother's connected talk at both assessment time points predict-
ing their children's social competence (T1: p = .022; T3: p = .011).  
 To the best of our knowledge, this is the first study to address associations between  
early connectedness in communication between mothers and children and children's later so-
cial competence. The findings indicate that a mother’s connectedness in communication with 
her child is one factor of the child's later social competence. Specifically, it was found that the 
more a mother was tuned into her child's talk at 24–31 months and 41–49 months of age, the 
fewer social difficulties she reported on the SRS-2 when her child was 5 years old.  
Some support for our findings of a relationship between the parent–child interaction style and 
aspects of a child's social competence can be found in a study that was conducted by Black 
and Logan (1995). They analysed similar communication aspects in 43 children (ages 24–60 
months) and their parents. Parents whose children were rejected by their peers were found to 
differ in their communication style compared to those children were popular. Parents whose 
children were rejected used more irrelevant turns, concurrent turns and those that failed to 
give the children time to respond following a request. Additionally, this failure to leave time 
for a response was observed in combination with more requests than those made by parents of 
popular children. Parents of rejected children were also more likely to respond contingently or 
not at all to their children's request. By contrast, parents of popular children were more likely 
to use a style of turn taking in which alternation of turns included relevant exchanges of in-
formation. These parents used shorter turns and provided room for their children to initiate 
topics. These findings on a relationship between the parent–child interaction style and aspects 
of a child's social competence have to be interpreted with care because the results are correla-
tions. The possibility that the rejected children in this study may also display other behav-
ioural problems that influence their acceptance by peers such as language difficulties cannot 




likely to have language-development deficits (Benner, Nelson, & Epstein, 2002; Nelson, 
Benner, Neill, & Stage, 2006). Therefore, there is a possibility that these children display less 
language abilities, which influence their parents' communication style. Accordingly, it has 
been argued that a child's difficulties in language development affects his or her parents, who 
consequently provide less than ideal input as a direct result of their effort to compensate for 
their toddler's deficits (Tannock & Girolametto, 1992; Whitehurst et al., 1988). A feasible 
explanation for the relationship between communication connectedness and social compe-
tence could be that children gain insight into their mother's mind in a shared moment of focus. 
Recall that maternal connected turns are semantically related comments associated to a child's 
previous utterance. Therefore, a connected utterance a mother produces is relevant to the 
child's current focus of attention. It could be argued that this shared conversational focus en-
hances a child's social understanding because in these connected moments, the child and the 
mother build up a shared perspective. Thus, the child gets an insight into the mind and the 
knowledge of the mother. The child might experience that the mother has a different perspec-
tive or understanding of the situation. Through this insight and the understanding that the 
mother knows things he or she does not know, a child learns to take others’ perspective, 
which is argued to be an important factor in one becoming socially competent. This aligns 
with a statement from Ensor and Hughes (2008) who proposed that the mothers’ connected-
ness is accelerating a child’s social understanding just as a child’s acquisition of language is 
enhanced by adults’ sensitivity in labelling objects within the child’s focus of attention.  
 No association has been found between the use of the mother's mental state words and 
children's SRS-2 scores in the current study (T1: p = .579; T3: p = .093). In other words, it 
was not found that a mother who referred more to mental states also reported fewer social 
difficulties for her child on the SRS-2. It might be the case that maternal mental state talk had 
no effect on the child's social competence per se, or the effect was not strong enough to be 




.063) in being a predictor of SRS-2 scores. Even if the result was not significant, it indicates a 
trend for a relationship between the child's production of mental state words and social com-
petence. A correlation was found between the child’s mental state talk at T1 and both parental 
questionnaires that assessed social competence at T4. This is consistent with studies that re-
ported that children's use of mental state terms in conversation was correlated with social 
measures (Brown et al., 1996; Brown & Dunn, 1991). 
  
5.4 The predictive relationship between mental state talk, communication connectedness 
and children's later social competence measured with the SDQ 
  
 In the current study, two parental questionnaires are used to assess children's social 
competence. While the SRS-2 is an instrument that consists of more items, the SDQ was used 
for additional screening. Nonetheless, being different measures, the SRS-2 and the SDQ tap 
into different behaviours at the item level. The SRS-2 is designed to identify children with 
social impairments and, therefore, its items measure various aspects of social awareness, so-
cial cognition, social communication, social motivation and autistic mannerisms. The items 
on the SDQ tap into aspects of children's emotions, conduct problems, hyperactivity, peer 
problems and pro-social behaviour. The rationale for including two measurements of social 
development was to consider Cavell's (1990) tripartite model and assess a broad spectrum of 
social competence-containing information about social skills, social performance and social 
adjustment. Furthermore, in the current study, correlations between the SDQ, the mother’s 
connectedness at T1 (r = −0.42) and child mental state words at T1 (r = −0.36) were found. 
Therefore, a hierarchical linear regression analysis was conducted to reveal how much unique 




 Communication connectedness scores accounted for 21% of the variance in SDQ 
scores and upon addition of the mental state talk measures, the hierarchical regression model 
accounted for 26% of the variance in SDQ scores. Additionally, it was the mother’s connect-
edness to their children's talk at the age of 24−31 months that predicted children's social out-
comes at the age of 5 years. In contrast to the results that addressed the SRS-2 scores, there 
was no significant relationship found between maternal communication connectedness and 
SDQ scores at the age of 42−48 months but they approached significance (p =.054). 
 Maternal mental state talk was not found to be a significant predictor of SDQ scores at 
any time point. In other words, it was not found that when a mother referred more to mental 
states, she also reported fewer social difficulties for her child on the SDQ. In addition, it 
might be the case that maternal mental state talk had no effect on the child's social compe-
tence per se, or the effect was not strong enough to be detected. Children's use of mental state 
words at T1 approached significance in being a predictor of SDQ scores (p = .052), thus indi-
cating that there is a trend between the child's production of mental state words and her or his 
social competence reported by the mother on the SDQ.  
 In summary, findings from both parental questionnaires were very similar, indicating 
that both questionnaires assessed the same construct even though they differed on a more spe-
cific level. Maternal connectedness was found to be a significant predictor of scores of both 






5.5 The relationship between performance of the false belief task and the child's social 
competence 
  
 In the current study, no significant relationship between children's performance of the 
false-belief task and social outcome from both SRS-2 scores (r(66) = .07) and SDQ scores 
(r(67) = .04) was found. These findings are not in line with previous studies that reported that 
false-belief understanding predicts later social outcome in children (De Rosnay et al., 2013; 
Slaughter et al., 2002). 
 This contradiction may have several reasons. First, as described in the preceding sec-
tion, the reason for this contradiction may lie within the task used to assess false-belief under-
standing (see section 5.2 for a discussion). Second, it is possible that a combination of several 
tasks that assess different aspects of false-belief understanding could have provided a differ-
ent picture. De Rosnay et al., (2013) used 10 tasks to assess false-belief understanding in chil-
dren, whereas Slaughter et al, (2002) assessed children on two tasks. Both of these research 
groups found a correlation between false-belief understanding and social competence.  
 Third, another possible explanation could be found in the lack of a definition of social 
competence. As discussed in Section 2.1, some researchers measure a set of social skills 
rather than assess social competence in a broader fashion, as Cavell (1990) suggested. Ac-
cording to Cavell, an assessment of social competence should include measures of social 
skills, social performance and social adjustment. De Rosnay et al. (2013) assessed successful 
conversational interactions of children (M= 78·8 months) with peers, which can be considered 
to be social skills. Slaughter et al. (2002) evaluated peer acceptance among pre-school chil-
dren, which is an index of the children's social adjustment. In the current study, two parent 
questionnaires (SRS-2 and SDQ) were used to assess not only social skills across different 
types of social situations but also indexes of social adjustment such as peer acceptance, lone-




very likely that these different levels of assessment can lead to different results. Looking at 
the previous studies discussed, one could hypothesise that false-belief understanding is related 
to more specific elements of social competence rather than to social competence in a broader 
context. Further research is warranted.  
 Fourth, the children in the previous studies were slightly older than the children in the 
current study. It is, therefore, possible that false-belief understanding is related to social com-
petence later in development. In fact, Slaughter et al. (2002) found that false-belief under-
standing was the best predictor only for children above the age of five years. Definitely, more 
studies are required to draw a clearer picture of this relationship.  
 In summary, in contradiction with previous research, it was not found that false-belief 
understanding in children was related to social competence. It is likely that defining and 
methodological issues were responsible for these contradictory findings. 
 
5.6 Additional factors that predict social competence 
  
 Secondary analyses were conducted to determine whether receptive and expressive 
language skills further accounted for the variance in social competence. The rationale for add-
ing these measurements was the modest amount of variance between the effects of communi-
cation connectedness and mental state talk on social competence, which indicated that other 
variables were likely to be involved in children's social development. Furthermore, it was 
based on the findings in previous studies that demonstrated that children with poor receptive 
and expressive language were at a higher risk of behaviour difficulties (Bretherton et al., 
2013a; Horwitz et al., 2003; Irwin et al., 2002). Therefore, in addition to the research ques-




receptive vocabulary measured through the CDI assessed at T1 and through the ROWPVT 
assessed at T1 and T3 accounted for further variance in social competence.  
 
The predictive relation between expressive and receptive vocabulary, mental state talk, 
communication connectedness and children's later social competence measured through 
the SRS-2  
 
 A hierarchical linear regression analysis was conducted to reveal how much variance 
in SRS-2 scores were accounted for by CDI and ROWPVT scores, mental state talk and con-
nectedness measures. As reported in Section 2.3, children with language impairment also of-
ten display difficulties in their social competence, indicating a relationship between language 
abilities and social competence. Therefore, CDI and ROWPVT scores were first added to the 
existing hierarchical linear regression model. The expressive and receptive language scores, 
communication connectedness and mental state talk at T1 accounted for 36% of the variance 
in SRS-2 scores at T4. By adding the CDI and the ROWPVT scores to the model, a much 
stronger model for the prediction of SRS-2 scores at T4 was created. There was a .19 increase 
in R², which is attributable to the addition of CDI and ROWPVT scores. CDI scores but not 
the ROWPVT scores at the age of 24 to 31 months were significant predictors (p = .011) of 
the children's social outcome (measured through SRS-2 scores) at the age of 5 years. In other 
words, the more words a child expressed at two years of age, the fewer social difficulties they 
displayed at the age of five years, according to their mothers. Children's early ability to suc-
cessfully express themselves to others may help in developing aspects of social competence. 
These results add to a growing body of evidence that indicates a robust correlation between 
children's expressive vocabulary and their social development (Carson et al., 1998; Carson, 





 In addition, adding CDI scores assessed at T1 increased the predicting strength of 
child mental state talk of SRS-2 scores, as they moved from approaching significance to sig-
nificance (p = .028). The more a child produced words to refer to mental states, the fewer so-
cial difficulties the child displayed, as reported by the mothers on the SRS-2. These findings 
add new evidence that children's ability to refer to mental states has a link to their broader 
social competence. Similar results have been reported by Brown et al. (1996) and Hughes, 
Fujisawa, Ensor, Lecce, and Marfleet (2006). Brown et al. (1996) observed 38–47-month-old 
children in spontaneous interactions with their mothers, siblings and best friends at home. The 
interactions were analysed and coded for the use of mental state terms by all speakers. Indi-
vidual differences in the frequency of mental state talk in sibling and friend dyads were corre-
lated with measures of co-operative and conflictual interaction, friendship quality and child 
characteristics. It was reported that mental state talk in the child–friend and child–sibling dy-
ads was correlated with positive, co-operative interactions between children. Hughes et al. 
(2006) observed 111 two-year-olds playing with a sibling at home. Children's talk about men-
tal states and the quality of the children's play with their siblings were analysed. A significant 
relationship was found between the children's use of mental state words and the quality of 
their play with siblings. While these results support the argument of a relationship between 
children's mental state talk and their social competence, our study provides new evidence that 
the same relationship can also be found when mental state talk is measured in a mother–child 
free–play interaction. Furthermore, the results presented by Brown et al. (1996) and Hughes et 
al., (2006) focus on correlations, whereas the current study provides a regression analysis that 
shows that there is a link between children's use of mental state words at the age of 24 to 31 
months and their social competence at 5 years. 
 A feasible explanation for this relation might be that children who address mental 
states more often do so because they are more aware of them, and they display a more pro-




(1996) reported that children's use of mental state terms was linked to their understanding of 
false belief. Additionally, Garner, Jones, Gaddy, and Rennie (1997) indicated that children's 
references to emotions were strongly linked with their own emotional perspective-taking. This 
understanding of mental states displayed in the children's use of mental state words was ar-
gued to be essential for everyday social interaction (Hughes & Dunn, 1998).  
   Furthermore, De Rosnay and Hughes (2006) stressed that children's spontaneous ref-
erence to mental states may reflect an eagerness to engage with the mental and emotional 
lives of others. This is further reflected in a reported developmental shift in children between 
four and five years of age with a significant increase over time in the proportion of words that 
refer to mental states of others rather than children’s own mental states (Hughes & Dunn, 
1998). This shift in development indicates that children become more aware and interested in 
mental states of others. This ability may result in a more nuanced understanding of others, 
which may play out in their relationships and the friendships they cultivate. This is in line 
with studies that reported a close relationship between children's mental state talk and their 
co-operative interaction with friends and siblings (Brown et al., 1996; Hughes et al., 2006). 
 Surprisingly, mothers’ connectedness was no longer a significant predictor of social 
outcome when CDI scores were added to the predicting model. This indicates that the child's 
expressive vocabulary including words that refer to mental states was a stronger predictor of 
their social competence. It could be hypothesised that the manner in which a child uses lan-
guage to interact with others is a stronger indicator of their social competence than the way a 






The predictive relations among expressive and receptive vocabulary, mental state talk, 
communication connectedness and children's later social competence measured through 
the SDQ 
 Similar to the results reported in the previous section, adding expressive and receptive 
vocabulary scores to the existing model increased the strength of the model, thus indicating 
that approximately 37% of the variance in SDQ scores was then explainable by CDI and 
ROWPVT scores, connectedness and mental state talk at T1. There was a .11 increase in R², 
which is attributable to the addition of CDI and ROWPVT scores. As it has been seen with 
the SRS-2 scores, adding the CDI scores to the hierarchical regression model resulted in the 
child’s mental state talk at T1 also becoming a significant predictor (p = .031) of social com-
petence. Maternal connectedness was no longer a significant predictor. These results support 
the previously discussed argument.  
 
5.7 Limitations of the current research 
  
 The limitations of the current study must be recognised. The first limitation concerns 
the size of the sample. Even though having data from a 3-year longitudinal study, including 
spontaneous language samples of 67 children and their mothers, is itself an important 
achievement, having a larger sample size would have increased the statistical significance of 
the results. This increase would have allowed for the addition of other variables such as gen-
der, socio-economic status or age to the predicting model, and additional relationships would 
have been detected. For example, Stokes and Klee (2009) reported that age, sex and socio-
economic status in two-year-olds were associated with expressive vocabulary. The longitudi-
nal study from which the data for the current study were drawn was ongoing, and it would 




assessment was mainly due to time limitations and the unavailability of the person who acted 
as the competitor in the false-belief task. Replacing the competitor would have changed the 
setting, and even if this change would have been subtle, it could have had an impact on the 
children's performance.  
 The second limitation concerns that the sample included mothers with a higher educa-
tion level than what is found in the general population of New Zealand (see Chapter 3.2). Ad-
ditionally, the majority of families were from middle-class to upper middle-class back-
grounds. This is of concern because significant relations were found between the mother’s 
mental state talk and their level of education (Meins et al., 2003; Ruffman, Slade, Devitt, & 
Crowe, 2006). Additionally, Cutting and Dunn (1999) and Dunn et al. (1991) reported that 
higher socio-economic status promoted false-belief understanding. This situation is not unlike 
the one in many other studies on children’s language, but it does mean that the group does not 
reflect the whole range of backgrounds found in the general population. Consequently, the 
study’s finding might not be generalisable to a wider population. A more comprehensive 
study would ensure that the sample also includes mothers with a lower education level and 
those from more diverse socio-economic backgrounds.  
 As described in Section 4.1, children as a group displayed high language and intellec-
tual abilities, which also do not reflect the general population. A more comprehensive study 
would include children on a broader spectrum of language and cognitive abilities. It could be 
assumed that in a group of children with lower language abilities, the differences in social 
competence would be greater since language was reported to be a significant predictor. 
 A further area of limitation concerns the measurement of the children's false-belief 
understanding. In the current study, only one task was used to measure false-belief under-
standing. Alternatively, assessing children on a combination of carefully selected assessments 
that measure false-belief understanding could provide more confidence about having compre-




include tasks that have been used on large representative samples have been examined for 
reliability and are suitable for young children at the same development stage.  
 Another limitation of this study is that only communication between mothers and their 
children was included. I focused on this because of the obvious influence mothers have on 
their children's development, which is described in the research literature. Nonetheless, fa-
thers and siblings are also reported to have an influence on a child's development. Children 
with more siblings are found to pass false-belief understanding tasks earlier (McAlister & 
Peterson, 2007; Perner et al., 1994; Ruffman et al., 1998). Furthermore, findings from the 
Pennsylvania Study of Social Understanding (Dunn, 1999) indicated that children spontane-
ously referred more often to mental states when they talked to siblings rather than to mothers. 
Therefore, for future studies, one recommendation is to include language samples with addi-
tional caregivers and, in particular, siblings who undoubtedly also influence a child's devel-
opment.  
 
5.8 Strength of the current research 
  
 In the present study, spontaneous language samples were assessed. In contrast to tasks 
in which the parents are asked to describe photographs or pictures, a spontaneous language 
sample provides a more accurate and valid measure of mothers’ and children's language. Al-
though the work load involved in the current study was significantly greater than analysing 
more standardised language assessments, it is one of the major strengths of this research, 
which is that data concerning language and communication stem from a nearly naturalistic 
observation.  
 Another strength of the current study is that a measure of children's mental state vo-




ability to mentalise their false-belief understanding and their social competence. The current 
study, therefore, adds important findings to our understanding of these aspects. 
 
5.9 Implications for clinical practice 
  
 One of the main questions that have been addressed in the current study was how lan-
guage and communication are related to social competence. The current study has identified 
that children's expressive vocabulary, including mental state terms and mothers’ interactional 
styles, partially predicts children's social competence. Therefore, these findings have practical 
implications for healthcare professionals who work with children and families. First, given 
that difficulties in these domains may be risk factors for social problems, early identification 
is critical, and these aspects could be included in a broader assessment. Additionally, since 
children's early ability to successfully express themselves to others and maternal connected-
ness may help in developing aspects of social competence, intervention programs that are 
supposed to enhance positive social competence are likely to be more effective when expres-
sive language and maternal connectedness are also targeted.   
 
5.10 Future research 
  
 The current study has addressed the relationship between language and social compe-
tence over time in very young children. Several possibilities for additional research have been 
stated throughout this chapter. Additionally, a future research project that assesses children 
with language impairment through similar tasks could add new valuable information. Since a 




connectedness, are found to be important for her or him to be socially competent, it could be 
hypothesised that the social difficulties observed in children with language impairment might 
partially stem from their difficulties within these domains. Specifically, research could assess 
whether the low language abilities of children with language difficulties affect their language 
input and range of communication opportunities. It was reported that mothers of children with 
language impairment were less responsive to their children's utterances than mothers of chil-
dren with typically developing language skills (Bishop, Chan, Adams, Hartley, & Weir, 2000; 
Hoffer & Bliss, 1990). 
 Since talking about mental states and communication connectedness seems to improve 
social competence, a controlled randomised intervention study could be performed. Such a 
study could consist of a group of mother–child pairs who engage in activities at home that 
animates children to talk about mental states and requires mothers to talk in a connected man-
ner with their children for a prolonged period of time (e.g., three months). At the end of the 
intervention, children's improvement in social competence could be measured by either stan-
dardised tasks or questionnaires. Meanwhile, the group could be compared to another group 
of mother–child dyads who engaged in a control task for the same period. This approach 
would help in determining whether talking about mental states and communication connect-




 The aim of the current study was to examine whether maternal or child’s mental state 
talk and/or communication connectedness is linked to social competence through the social 




belief. Exploring variation in children's language skills and their conversational environment 
can provide indications of how typically developing children come to be socially competent.  
 In the current study, mothers’ connected communication played a role in their chil-
dren's social development. This is the first time that these aspects of mothers' verbal interac-
tion style have been assessed in relation with children's social competence. It was found that 
mothers who more often refer to their children's utterances and who reformulated, elaborated 
or answered to them in an appropriate manner described their children as socially more ad-
vanced later in development compared to mothers who were less connected in communication 
with their children. However, mothers’ connectedness in communication with their children 
was no longer a significant predictor once the children's expressive and receptive language 
abilities were added to the model.  
 Children's language abilities, including their production of mental state terms at two 
years of age, were stronger predictors of their social competence at the age of five years. Spe-
cifically, children's expressive vocabulary at the age of 24 to 31 months was a significant pre-
dictor of their social competence at the age of 5 years. These findings add to a growing body 
of evidence that indicates that language is related to social competence through a child's abil-
ity of being able to successfully express themselves with words. What has been unknown so 
far is that children's ability to express words that refer to mental states also plays a predicting 
role in their social development. It was found that children who produced more words to refer 
to their own and others’ mental states such as emotions, desires and cognition were reported 
to have fewer social difficulties later in development than children who made less references 
to mental states. These findings indicate that children who refer more frequently to mental 
states might also be more aware of them and, therefore, display a more profound understand-
ing of others' mind and emotions. The ability to refer to mental states might help children to 




 Contrary to previous research, mental state talk and communication connectedness 
were not related to false-belief understanding, nor did I find support in the argument that chil-
dren who understand false-belief are socially more competent. In both cases, it is likely that 
methodological issues were responsible for these contradictory findings.  
 In conclusion, the current study has made a positive contribution to the knowledge that 
the process of becoming socially competent encompasses having words to express oneself 
effectively. It also adds new findings that indicate that using words that refer to mental states 
is important for the development of children's social competence. However, the role of the 
ability to take someone else's perspective and understand that a person might be holding a 





Appendix A: Summary of predictive models relating to Chapter 2 
 
Author Participants Predictor variables Outcome variables R² 
Adrian, Clemente, 
Villanueva, & Rieffe 
(2005) 
n = 34 
age: M = 4.10 years 
mothers’ mental state language 
(frequency and types) 
 
children's false belief 
understanding 
.13 
Adrian, Clemente, & 
Villanueva (2007) 
T1 n = 41 
age: M = 4.7 years 
T2 n= 37 
age: M = 5.9 years 
 
mothers' use of mental state 
words 
 
children's false belief 
understanding 
.08 
Astington & Jenkins 
(1999) 
T1 n = 59 
age: M = 3.4 years 
T3 n = 59 
age: M =  4.1 years  
age, general language abilities false belief understanding .53 
Boivin, Hymel & 
Bukowski (1995) 
n = 774 
M  = 10.10 years 
 







Brownlie et al. (2004) T1 n = 284 
age: M = 5.6 years 
T2 n = 244 
age = 12 - 13 years  
T3 n = 258 
age: M = 18.10 years 
 
language impairment young adult's delinquency 
young adult's aggression 
.093 
.069 
De Rosnay, Fink, 
Begeer, Slaughter, & 
Peterson (2013) 
n = 129 
age: M = 6.7 years  
false belief understanding socially competent every-
day behaviour like suc-
cessful conversational 




kowski, Tesla, & 
Youngblade (1991) 
n = 50 
T1 age: M = 33 
months 
T2 age: M = 40 
months 
 
Family discourse about feelings 
 




Ensor and Hughes 
(2008) 
T1 n= 120 
age: M = 2.38 years 
T2 age: M = 3.45 
years 
T3 age: 4.19 years 
 
Maternal education, number of 
mother's and child's turns, 
mother and child connectedness, 
mother and child mental state 
references 
 
children's false belief 
understanding 
.50 
Howard, Mayeux & 
Naigles (2008) 
n = 60 
Group 1: n= 16 
age: M  = 3.7 years 
Group 2: n = 16 
age: M  = 3.5 years 
Group 3: n = 16 
age: M = 4.5 years 
Group 4: n = 12 
age: M = 4.4 years 
 
age, auditory comprehension of 
language, maternal cognitive 
mental states 




Kogushi, Lollis, & 
T1 n = 40 
age: M = 4.4 years 
family members cognitive talk 
 







Ross (2003) age younger siblings: 
M = 2.4 years 
T2 n= 37 
age: M = 6.3 years 
age younger siblings: 
M = 4.4 years 
 
Racine, Carpendale, & 
Turnbull (2007) 
n = 78 
age: M = 4.5 years 
 
child belief emotion talk 
 
children's false belief 
understanding 
.05 
Slade & Ruffman 
(2005) 
n = 44 
age: M =3.8 years 
 
general language abilities children's false belief 
understanding 
.10 
Ruffman, Slade, & 
Crowe (2002) 
T1 (age: M = 3.01) 
T2 (age: M = 3.41) 
T3 (age: M = 4.04) 
 





mothers' use of mental state 
words T2  
 
children's false belief 
understanding T2  
 
children's false belief 
understanding T3  







& Racine (2008) 
n = 70 
age: M = 4.5 years 
 
talk about aspects of the false-
belief component 
 
children's false belief 
understanding 
.09 
Watson, Painter & 
Bornstein (2001) 
T1 n =  
age: M = 24 
T2 n =  
age: M = 48 
 
general language ability T1 
 
 






Note. Authors of studies were ordered alphabetically. R² reported here is given for the predictive variables after 




































Theory of Mind – Data sheets for false belief task 
 
Right/Left randomizing: 1 
 
Date Name Date of birth Age  
    
 
Familiarisation 
Trial Side Choice 
1.1 right  
1.2 left  
1.3 right  
1.4 left  
1.5 right  
1.6 left  
1.7 left  
 
Test trials 
Trial Side Choice 
2.1 left  
2.2 right  
2.3 right  







Appendix E: New Zealand version of the MacArthur Bates Communicative Develop-




































































Appendix H: Plots transformed data  
 
Tests of Normality 
 
Kolmogorov-Smirnova Shapiro-Wilk 
Statistic df Sig. Statistic df Sig. 
cConnected_T1TR .120 53 .055 .907 53 .001 
cConnected_T3TR .109 53 .170 .976 53 .357 
mConnected_T1TR .178 53 .000 .922 53 .002 
mConnected_T3TR .072 53 .200* .951 53 .031 
cTotalMST_T1TR .077 53 .200* .976 53 .358 
cTotalMST_T3TR .120 53 .055 .966 53 .129 
mTotalMST_T1TR .106 53 .200* .943 53 .014 





































































Appendix I: Variable names 
Measure Variable name 
  
Participants  
Participant ID PID 
Child's sex cSex 
Child's date of birth cDOB 
Child's birth order cBirthOrder 
No. children in family at T1 NoKidsFam_T1 
No. children in family at T3 NoKidsFam_T3 
Are children in daycare at T1 Daycare_T1 
Hours spent in daycare at T1 DaycareHrs_T1 
Are children in daycare at T3 Daycare_T3 
Hours spent in daycare at T3 DaycareHrs_T3 
Mother education level MotherEducLevel_T1 
  
Language survey measures  
Based on the New Zealand English adaptation 
of the MacArthur-Bates Communication De-
velopment Inventory: Word Sentences (CDI)  
 
T1 age (months) CDI_age_T1 
T1 word size CDIwords_raw_T1 
T1 word percentile (based on NZ norms) CDIwords_PS_NZ_T1 
T1 word combination CDIwc_T1 
  
Assessment measures  
  
Receptive One-Word Picture Vocabulary Test, 
4th ed. (ROWPVT-4) 
 
- Time 1  
- age (months) ROWPVT_age_T1 
- raw score ROWPVT_raw_T1 
- Time 3  
- age (months) ROWPVT_age_T3 
- raw score  ROWPVT_raw_T3 
  
Clinical Evaluation of Language Fundamentals 
- Preschool-2 (CELF-P2) 
- Time 4  
- age (months)  
- Sentence structure raw score CELF P2_SS_raw_T4 
- Concepts & following directions raw score CELF P2_CF_raw_T4 
- Basic Concepts raw scores CELF P2_BC_raw_T4 
- Word structure raw score CELF P2_WS_raw_T4 
- Expressive vocabulary raw score CELF P2_EV_raw_T4 
- Recalling Sentences raw score CELF P2_RS_raw_T4 
- Expressive Language Index standard score CELF P2_ELI_standard_T4 
- Receptive Language Index standard score CELF P2_RLI_standard_T4 




- Language Structure Index standard score CELF P2_LSI_standard_T4 
- Core Language Score standard score CELF P2_CLS_standard_T4 
  
Raven's Coloured Progressive Matrices (CPM)  
Time 4 age (months) CPM_age_T4 
- No. of correct items of total 12 Set A CPMTotalSetA_T4 
- No. of correct items of total 12 Set B CPMTotalSetAB_T4 
- No. of correct items of total 12 Set C CPMTotalSetC_T4 
- No. of correct items of total 36 (Set A, Set 
AB, Set C) 
TotalCPMScores_T4 
  
Theory of Mind Task (0=failed, 1=passed)  
Time 4 age (months) ToM_age_T4 
- passed/failed test trial 1 ToMTestTrial1_T4 
- passed/failed test trial 2 ToMTestTrial2_T4 
- passed/failed test trial 3 ToMTestTrial3_T4 
- passed/failed test trial 4 ToMTestTrial4_T4 
- passed/failed task ToMTask_T4 
  
Transcription of Spontaneous Playing Situa-
tion 
 
Coding Communication   
-Time 1  
- Communication Child  
- No. of connected turns cConnected_T1 
- No. of failed turns cFailed_T1 
- No. of initiated turns cInitiation_T1 
- No. of unclear turns cUnclear_T1 
- No. of total turns cTotalTurns_T1 
- Communication Mother   
- No. of connected turns mConnected_T1 
- No. of failed turns mFailed_T1 
- No. of initiated turns mInitiation_T1 
- No. of unclear turns mUnclear_T1 
- No. of total turns mTotalTurns_T1 
- Time 3  
- Communication Child   
- No. of connected turns cConnected_T3 
- No. of failed turns cFailed_T3 
- No. of initiated turns cInitiation_T3 
- No. of unclear turns cUnclear_T3 
- No. of total turns cTotalTurns_T3 
- Communication Mother   
- No. of connected turns mConnected_T3 
- No. of failed turns mFailed_T3 
- No. of initiated turns mInitiation_T3 
- No. of unclear turns mUnclear_T3 
- No. of total turns mTotalTurns_T3 




- Time 1  
-MST Child   
- No. of terms referring to physiological states cPhysiological_T1 
- No. of terms referring to emotional states cEmotion_T1 
- No. of terms referring to desire states cDesire_T1 
- No. of terms referring to cognitive states cCognition_T1 
-Total number of MST cTotalMST_T1 
- Total number of completed words cTcompletedW_T1 
-MST Mother   
- No. of terms referring to physiological states mPhysiological_T1 
- No. of terms referring to emotional states mEmotion_T1 
- No. of terms referring to desire states mDesire_T1 
- No. of terms referring to cognitive states mCognition_T1 
-Total number of MST mTotalMST_T1 
- Total number of completed words mTcompletedW_T1 
-Time 3  
-MST Child   
- No. of terms referring to physiological states cPhysiological_T3 
- No. of terms referring to emotional states cEmotion_T3 
- No. of terms referring to desire states cDesire_T3 
- No. of terms referring to cognitive states cCognition_T3 
-Total number of MST cTotalMST_T3 
- Total number of completed words cTcompletedW_T3 
-MST Mother   
- No. of terms referring to physiological states mPhysiological_T3 
- No. of terms referring to emotional states mEmotion_T3 
- No. of terms referring to desire states mDesire_T3 
- No. of terms referring to cognitive states mCognition_T3 
-Total number of MST mTotalMST_T3 
- Total number of completed words mTcompletedW_T3 
Child T4  
  
Parent Questionnaires   
  
Strengths and Difficulties Questionnaire (SDQ)  
- Time 4  
- age (months) SDQ_age_T4 
- Emotional problems scale  SDQEmotionalSymptoms_T4 
- Conduct problems scale SDQConductProblems_T4 
- Hyperactivity scale SDQHyperactivity_T4 
- Peer problems scale SDQPeerProblems_T4 
- Prosocial scale SDQProsocialBehaviour_T4 
- generated by summing scores from all the 
scales except the prosocial scale 
SDQTotalDifficulties_T4 
- sum of the conduct and hyperactivity scales SDQExternalising_T4 








- Time 4  
- age (months) SRS2_age_T4 
- raw scores of sum of Awr, Cog, Com, Mot, 
RRB scores 
SRS2TotalRawScore_T4 
- T scores of sum of Awr, Cog, Com, Mot, 
RRB scores 
SRS2TotalTScore_T4 
- raw scores of social awareness SRS2AwrRawScore_T4 
- T scores of social awareness SRS2AwrTScore_T4 
- raw scores of social cognition SRS2CogRawScore_T4 
- T scores of social cognition SRS2CogTScore_T4 
- raw scores of social communication SRS2ComRawScore_T4 
- T scores of social communication SRS2ComTScore_T4 
- raw scores of social motivation SRS2MotRawScore_T4 
- T scores of social motivation SRS2MotTScore_T4 
- raw scores of restricted interests and repeti-
tive behavior 
SRS2RRBRawScore_T4 
- T scores of restricted interests and repetitive 
behaviour 
SRS2RRBTScore_T4 
- raw scores of social communication and in-
teraction 
SRS2SCIRawScore_T4 








Appendix J: Means and standard deviations with and without outliers 
Means and Standard Deviations without Outliers 
 
Variable M SD n Min. Max. 
Child Connected T1 -0.35 0.12 66 -0.79 -0.16 
Child Connected T3 -0.32 0.10 67 -0.58 -0.13 
Mother Connected T1 -0.30 0.18 66 -0.92 0.00 
Mother Connected T3 -0.26 0.12 67 -0.64 -0.08 
Child Mental State Words T1 -1.95 0.33 53 -2.72 -1.36 
Child Mental State Talk T3 -1.72 0.22 66 -2.21 -1.22 
Mother Mental State Words T1 -1.59 0.12 66 -1.88 -1.39 
Mother Mental State Talk T3 -1.52 0.13 66 -1.83 -1.25 
 
 
Means and Standard Deviations with Outliers 
 
Variable M SD n Min. Max. 
Child Connected T1 -0.37 0.16 67 -1.22 -0.16 
Child Connected T3 -0.32 0.10 67 -0.58 -0.13 
Mother Connected T1 -0.31 0.22 67 -1.35 0.00 
Mother Connected T3 -0.26 0.12 67 -0.64 -0.08 
Child Mental State Words T1 -1.95 0.33 53 -2.72 -1.36 
Child Mental State Talk T3 -1.72 0.22 66 -2.21 -1.22 
Mother Mental State Words T1 -1.60 0.13 67 -2.04 -1.39 
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